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Abstract
This thesis explores how tax treaty articles providing foreign tax recognition, distributive rules,
meanings for undefined terms, and anti-treaty shopping rules implicitly employ conflict of laws
“choice of law” (“COL/col”) principles to derive the governing law in situations where more
than one tax law and therefore more than one legal system applies to characterize a person or
income. COL/col principles are implicitly acknowledged and specifically operate in tax treaties
to reconcile contending tax laws and therefore legal systems. Considering tax treaty articles
implore countries to ascertain the governing law through reconciliation, supranational
approaches that advocate harmonization to ascertain governing law are unnecessary.
Reconciliatory approaches are preferrable to harmonization approaches because the former
supports countries’ law-making sovereignty and the latter does not.
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Introduction

The objective of this thesis is to show that tax treaties reconcile simultaneous, legitimate,
divergent application of countries’ domestic tax laws by latently employing conflict of laws
“choice of law” (“COL/col”) principles to ascertain the governing law for the tax treaty article
applicable in the circumstances. Reconciliatory approaches latently employing COL/col
principles are good because they acknowledge the inevitable encounter of countries’ legal
systems on the terrain of international taxation, anticipate diverse legal systems, and support
countries’ law-making sovereignty by permitting both legal systems to remain intact, unchanged,
and unharmonized even though one of the contending legal systems prevails over the other
contenders and applies in the circumstances. If the full extent of the heuristic utility of tax
treaties’ reconciliatory approach is understood, supranational law currently advocated by the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) can be better understood
as unnecessary and undesirable.
There is no “international tax system” within the conventional understanding of a ‘legal
system’.1 Wilkie and Hogg write, “[t]he first ‘rule’ of international tax law is that there is no
‘international tax law’”.2 This is, in part, as Ault and Bradford allude to, because there is no
natural law of the location and therefore the right to tax income.3 There is no international tax
law because there is no international tax law system, the operation of which effectuates
enactment, enforcement, and adjudication of ‘hard’ law on the international stage.4 This is
because the international tax environment is not bound together by, nor operates through the
distinct, separate, and mutually-reliant functions of the key and core systemic features found in
1

Scott Wilkie and Peter Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System” (2015) 52:2 OHLJ 460 at 478 [Wilkie
and Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System”]; See also Hugh J Ault and David F Bradford, “Taxing
International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises” in Assaf Razin and Joel Slemrod,
eds., Taxation in the Global Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 11 at 31 [Ault and Bradford,
“Taxing International Income”].
2
Wilkie and Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System”, ibid at 478.
3
Ault and Bradford, “Taxing International Income”, supra note 1 at 31.
4
Many transnational and post-national theorists write about how “law” can be and is created without the presence of
such structures: Kalypso Nicolaidis and Gregory Shaffer, “Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance
without Global Government,” (2005) 68 L & Cont Prob 263; Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Private Regulatory
Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power,” (2013) 76: 2 L & Cont Prob 117; Roger
Cotterrell, “Transnational legal authority: a socio-legal perspective” in Roger Cotterrell & Maksymilian Del Mar,
eds., Authority in Transnational Legal Theory: Theorising Across Disciplines (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Pub, 2016) 25; Keith Charles Culver and Michael Giudice, The Unsteady State: General Jurisprudence for Dynamic
Social Phenomena (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017) [Culver and Giudice, The Unsteady State].
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other legal environments recognized as legal systems. In the Canadian context, such systemic
features are the legislature, executive, and judiciary. There is no international legislature which
passes international tax statutes through an agreed-upon process for legitimacy. There is no
international tax authority wielding delegated power to enforce international tax statutes. There
is no international tax court to adjudicate disputes that arise regarding the application of
international tax statutes or the actions of an international tax authority.5 Unlike other areas of
international law and notwithstanding the “constructive” international tax system that grew up
“impelled by globalization’s challenges” manifest in e.g., countries’ voluntary adoption of
“compatible or similarly directed domestic tax responses to common international economic
events, which often are captured in a tailored way through bespoke tax treaties with legal force to
align the specific intersection of countries tax regimes”,6 international tax disputes must rely
heavily on the inter alia legal determinations of local courts, and negotiations of local tax
authorities on the international stage.7
Rather than an ‘international tax system’, the international tax landscape is a patchwork
of domestic tax regimes. Each country makes private laws which in turn feed the interpretations,
meanings, and application of the tax law.8
Whenever private legal systems encounter one another in taxation or other circumstances,
negotiations of state sovereignty are taking place. Law circumscribes and describes human life
and behaviour. Local law should correlate to the way local people live and want to live.9 Tax law
is no different.10 Tax law and policy are ultimately derived from social priorities which differ
from nation to nation. 11 Social priorities drive political priorities.12 Political priorities drive
5

Wilkie and Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System”, supra note 1 at 478.
Wilkie and Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System”, ibid at 478.
7
The OECD’s Pillars imply the creation of a single world order tax system via countries enacting domestic changes
to their laws. For more detail on the Pillars, see discussion under the heading “3.4.1 OECD Picking Up Borderless
World Paradigm” and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Statement by the OECD/G20
Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the
Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris: OECD, 2020) [OECD 2020 Pillars Report].
8
Because tax law is an accessory to the private law: Wilkie and Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System”,
supra note 1 at 484; See also Matias Milet and Christopher Sheridan, “The Income Tax Act as ‘Accessory’: A
Modern Re-Examination” in Jinyan Li, J Scott Wilkie, and Larry F Chapman, eds, Income Tax at 100 Years: Essays
and Reflections on the Income War Tax Act (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2017) 13:1-31 [Milet and
Sheridan, “The Income Tax Act as ‘Accessory’”].
9
Edward D Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This: How Government Should Spend Our Money (Oxford UK: Oxford
University Press, 2014) [Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This].
10
Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This, ibid.
11
Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This, ibid.
12
Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This, ibid.
6
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economic priorities. 13 Economic priorities drive fiscal priorities.14 Encounter of local legal
systems on the international stage means a negotiation of the bounds of local sovereignty.15
When two countries’ private law characterize and render taxable the same item of income
or capital at their respective domestic law, more than one country stakes a tax claim to it, causing
tax claims to overlap and tax law and legal systems to come into encounter. Countries’ tax
systems increasingly encounter one another in a globalized, digitized, world economy dominated
by multinational enterprises carrying on business in multiple jurisdictions at once. Corporate
income is connected to more than one jurisdiction in a way that justifies more than one
jurisdiction staking a legitimate tax claim to it on source or residence bases.
With each jurisdiction having the power to pass whatever tax laws it sees fit within its
territory, double taxation of multinational enterprises is a real possibility. The international tax
community is in consensus that excessive or double taxation would result in a slowdown of cross
border flows. Domestic income tax laws are a two-pronged mechanism for raising revenue to
support public spending, and incentivizing or disincentivizing behaviour.16 Tax treaties provide
“some measure of organization about how these rules coexist internationally without impairing
business activity and the mobility of capital and persons”.17 This project and purpose emanates
from the work of the League of Nations in the early 20th century.18 “[F]riendship, commerce,
and navigation” treaties acknowledged countries’ “legitimate claim to a shared tax base
associated with international commerce” and that “a reliable means of sharing [was] critical”. 19
Early treaties endeavoured to “avoid gratuitous impediments to trade attributable to the
regulation of business activities” on the understanding that countries had an individual and

13

Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This, ibid.
Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This, ibid.
15
See e.g., Dani Roderick, The Gobalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New
York: Norton, 2011) [Roderick, Globalization Paradox]: Democracies have the right to protect their social
arrangements, and when this right clashes with the requirement of the global economy, it is the latter that should
give way.... a thin layer of international rules that leave substantial room for manoeuvre by national is a better
globalization. It can address globalization's ills while preserving its substantial economic benefits period we need
smart globalization, not maximum globalization.... The real challenge is to safeguard the integrity of each nation's
corporate tax regime in a world where enterprises and their capital are footloose. This challenge remains [in 2021]
unaddressed.
16
See Scott Wilkie and Lara Friedlander, “Policy Forum: The History of Tax Treaty Provisions – And Why It Is
Important To Know About”, (2006) 54:4 Canadian Tax Journal 907 at 909 [Wilkie and Friedlander, “The History of
Tax Treaty Provisions”].
17
See Wilkie and Friedlander, “The History of Tax Treaty Provisions”, ibid at 909.
18
See Wilkie and Friedlander, “The History of Tax Treaty Provisions”, ibid at 909.
19
See Wilkie and Friedlander, “The History of Tax Treaty Provisions”, ibid at 909.
14
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collective interest in “avoiding impediments to trading relationships in commercial activity
occasioned by uncoordinated multiple taxation of the same income and the same taxpayers”.20
In 1923, the League of Nations adopted the “benefits principle” whereby active income is
taxed primarily in the country of source and passive income is taxed primarily in the country of
residence.21 In 1927, the League of Nations papered the “single tax principle” to deal with
“questions of tax evasion and double taxation in coordination with each other”, amounting to
among “[t]he most elementary and undisputed principles of fiscal justice … whereby all incomes
would be taxed once and only once”.22
In order to mitigate distortions arising from excessive taxation as identified by the
League of Nations, international trade and domestic foreign policy goals, countries enter into tax
treaties which to this day embody the “benefits principle” and “single tax principle”, to negotiate
how each other’s residents will be treated in their treaty partner’s territory and in so doing
allocate taxing rights between jurisdictions. The OECD Model Tax Treaty23 and the United
Nations (“UN”) Model Tax Treaty24 on which most of the world's tax treaties are based and
which themselves are substantially similar,25 contain provisions for allocating taxing rights in
respect of different income categories, e.g., interest, dividends, royalties, employment income,
business income, capital gains, etc., on source or residence bases.
The international tax order is held together by these treaties to manage the overlap of
countries’ tax claims. Bilateral tax treaties reflect political negotiations to allocate countries’

20

See Wilkie and Friedlander, “The History of Tax Treaty Provisions”, ibid at 909.
Reuven Avi-Yonah, “International Taxation of Electronic Commerce”, (1997) 52 Tax L Rev 507 at 556 [AviYonah, “International Taxation of Electronic Commerce”]; One of the economists on whose work the ideas were
based was Edwin RA Seligman, “Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation being a series of Lectures
delivered at the Academie de Droit International de la Haye” (New York: McMillan, 1928).
22
Report Presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of
Nations Doc. G.216.M.85 II (1927) [League of Nations, Single Tax Principle Report].
23
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital:
Full Version 2017 (Paris: OECD, 2017) [OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty].
24
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention
between Developed and Developing Countries 2017 (New York: United Nations, 2017) [UN Model Tax Treaty].
25
The OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23, favours states imposing residence-based taxation, which are
usually more economically developed countries. The UN Model Tax Treaty, ibid, favours states imposing sourcebased taxation, which are usually less economically developed countries.
21

4

respective taxing rights and to broker inter-nation deals using tax revenues as consideration.26
Charles Kingson writes of the transactional nature of tax treaties:27
To protect their international tax interests, countries negotiate tax treaties; and in the same way that [United
States Tax Code] provisions identify the competing interests of taxpayers, treaty provisions identify those
of countries. Source countries accede to the revenue needs of residence countries by limiting or foregoing
tax; in return, residence countries enhance the ability of source countries to attract investment by either
exempting income taxed in the source country or by crediting source country taxes against their own; and
each recognizes the other's right to compete by agreeing not to discriminate in favor of its own nationals.

Ultimately, a tax treaty operates as contract between nations: mutual offers accepted with
signatures, through the use of forgone tax revenues as consideration to meet the contracting
states’ shared and individual goals. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)
requires countries perform their treaties in “good faith”.28 Tax treaties bear a striking likeness
contracts both in the features necessary for their existence, i.e., offer, acceptance and
consideration, and in their structure of defining terms,29 setting the bargain,30 elucidating what is
required for its performance,31 and making corollary promises to enable the same.32 In this, tax
treaties as contracts rely on a governing law.
All contracts, including tax treaties, need a governing law through which to ascertain the
legal context, meaning of terms, and obligations. Conflicts of tax laws arise when the contracting
states cannot ascertain the governing law for their treaty, resulting in simultaneous, legitimate,
and divergent legal characterizations of an event or transaction in each contracting state. At the
core of conflicts of tax laws is the question, ‘what is the nature of the transaction, person,

26

In effect, countries face the “trilemma” Dani Roderick describes in his Globalization Paradox when negotiating
their tax treaties (among other contexts), where countries must essentially choose between sovereignty, global trade,
and democracy: Roderick, Globalization Paradox, supra note 15 at xv-xxii and 187-206; See also Stanley Surrey’s
discussion of tax treaties as tax expenditures: Stanley S Surrey and Paul R McDaniel, “The Tax Expenditure
Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues” (1979) 20:2 Boston College L Rev 225 at 336-354 on
“International Aspects of Tax Expenditures” and specifically “Double Taxation Treaty Principles and Negotiations”
at 348.
27
Charles I Kingson, “The Coherence of International Taxation” (1981) 81:6 Colum L Rev 1151 [Kingson,
“Coherence of International Taxation”] at 1157.
28
As required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force January 27
1980) [VCLT], art 26.
29
E.g., Articles 2-5 of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23, prescribe definitions for terms that appear
in the distributive or bargain-containing articles.
30
E.g., Articles 6-22 of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid, set out how the contracting states agree to behave
in respect of taxation of income and capital.
31
E.g., Articles 23A and 23B of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid, provide rules for foreign tax recognition.
32
E.g., Articles 24-32 of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid, address issues of non-discrimination, exchange of
information, assistance in the collection of taxes, territorial extensions, coming into force, termination, among others
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income, etc.?’ and the two (or more) divergent responses proffered to answer it. This legal
question is important because from its answer can be determinations significant to the levying of
tax. To come to the same answer of what the transaction is, countries need to know and agree on
the governing law for their treaty, i.e., the mechanism through which the question of ‘what is the
nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ is answered. When the governing law is not
identified or agreed upon, two or more legal systems conceivably apply to characterize a person,
income, or event.33 When those legal systems yield different characterizations, excessive or
insufficient taxation may result. When governing law is identified and agreed upon, the question,
‘what is the nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ is answered with the same legal
responses by both countries who ask it, causing divergence and resultant undesirable tax
outcomes to disappear.
There are multiple ways to ascertain the governing law of a tax treaty, among them,
recourse to: unilateral domestic law, supranational law, and bilateral reconciliation. The
unilateral domestic law approach involves countries passing domestic tax laws that tell the tax
authorities, courts, and parties of states how income with an international character is
characterized and taxed. For example, Canada’s Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act,34 is
a statute of general interpretive application and applies to all Canada’s tax treaties. Section 3
identifies the governing law for certain treaty provisions as Canada’s law, and section 4
identifies the governing law for other circumstances.35
The supranational approach includes international proposals that multinational corporate
taxation should take place at the de facto global rather than national level through global tax laws
effected through domestic tax laws, with proceeds allocated to countries on certain criteria
instead of on the basis of source or residence entitlement. In the OECD’s Inclusive Framework
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“OECD IF on BEPS”), Pillar One, market jurisdictions in
certain industries will tax residual profits via destination-based cash flow taxes, or formulary
apportionment, instead of the current source/residence paradigm.36

33

For a similar concept, see Jacques Sasseville, “Klaus Vogel Lecture: Tax Treaties and the Schödinger’s Cat”
(2009) 63:2 Bulletin for International Taxation 45 [Sasseville, “Schrödinger’s Cat”].
34
Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-4, s 2 [ITCIA].
35
E.g., ITCIA, ibid, for permanent establishments in Canada (s 4); application of GAAR (s 4.1); stock exchanges (s
4.2); non-resident trusts (s 4.3); and further elucidated definitions (s 5).
36
OECD 2020 Pillars Report, supra note 7.
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The bilateral reconciliation approach appears in tax treaties and involves prioritizing one
legal system over another depending on the circumstances while leaving the other contender
unchanged. Tax treaties implicitly acknowledge reconciliation approaches through their latent
incorporation of COL/col principles. Conflict of laws is a legal discipline and a system of
thought37 through which to reconcile simultaneously-applicable and legitimately-applicable legal
systems. As will be discussed later, tax treaties employ a latent COL/col approach to ascertain
governing law based on which of the contending countries has the closest legitimate connection
to the events in question.
Unilateral, supranational, and reconciliatory approaches all endeavour to ascertain the
governing law for the given treaty article. Unilateral approaches ascertain governing law by
national initiatives without requirement of consultation with the other countries which such laws
may affect. Supranational approaches propose to ascertain governing law by actual
harmonization of contending legal systems through domestic law change.38 Reconciliatory
approaches seek a governing law by acknowledging and weighing the claims for one country’s
law to apply over the other, and by choosing one legal system out of the contenders with the
closest legitimate connection to the events in question to carry the day. In these three approaches,
the question of ‘what is the nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ is answered, but each
does so differently and with its cost.
If adopted as proposed, the cost of the supranational approach is adverse effects on state
sovereignty. If there is only one de facto global tax law as the supranational approach proposes,
there is no conflict of tax laws because the question of ‘what is the nature of the transaction,
person, income, etc.?’ is answered by all countries in the same way. However, it is because
countries’ tax laws have conformed to a global standard rather than reflecting the specific local

37

See Paul Schiff Berman, “The evolution of global legal pluralism” in Roger Cotterrell & Maksymilian Del Mar,
eds., Authority in Transnational Legal Theory: Theorising Across Disciplines (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Pub, 2016) 151 [Schiff Berman, “Legal Pluralism”] regarding conflict of laws as a system of thought, i.e., as a
“technique” and a “discursive framework that structures thought”, citing Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels and Annelise
Riles, “From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style” (2012) 64 Stan L
Rev 589. In a similar vein, see Dirk Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2014); Jeffrey L Dunoff, “A New Approach to Regime Interaction” in Margaret A Young,
ed, Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Frag-mentation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2012) 136. For the different theories of conflict of laws, see Ralf Michaels, “Post-critical Private International Law:
From Politics to Technique” in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández-Arroyo, eds, Private International Law
and Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 54.
38
E,g., OECD 2020 Pillars Report, supra note 7.
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intricacies of the countries and persons who live in them. The OECD IF on BEPS, Pillar Two,
anticipates a global minimum tax by closing the door to low-tax incentives in countries that
employ them. Pillar Two focuses on what amounts to a global minimum corporate tax with the
effect of undermining local uses of tax expenditures.
Supranational approaches, and the costs they demand are unnecessary because tax treaties
employing COL/col principles already have mechanisms to ascertain governing law via bilateral
reconciliation. This approach to ascertaining governing law is most consistent with the historical
purpose of tax treaties. As is seen from the League of Nations work discussed above, the purpose
of tax treaties is to facilitate bilateral reconciliation and support states’ sovereignty, not to
harmonize sovereign state tax systems.
Approaches that reconcile multiple states’ sovereignty are important because, according
to Raz, a nation’s law claims a position of comprehensive supremacy and authority and “[s]ince
all legal systems claim to be supreme with respect to their subject-community, none can
acknowledge any claim to supremacy over the same community which may be made by another
legal system”.39 Absent a system for reconciliation, no sovereign state need cede to another.
Legal pluralists such as Roughan advocate for an “account of law that explains how different
supremacy claims can be integrated and mutually recognized while upholding the authority of
law”.40 A state must “recognize the relativity of its own claim to the claim of others, and of their
claims to its own”41 in order to “cooperate, coordinate, or tolerate one another if they are to have
legitimacy”.42 Tax treaties employ COL/col principles in order to do this.
The systematic way to negotiate state sovereignty where private legal regimes as the
manifestation of state sovereignty encounter one another is the legal discipline of conflict of
laws.43 The purpose of conflict of laws as a legal discipline is to mediate states’ sovereignty over
their domains by adjudicating the extent to which that state’s law as microcosmic encapsulations
of social, economic, political and fiscal priorities, should apply in a dispute. Reconciliation of
39

Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 117 [Raz, Authority of Law] at
119.
40
Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013) [Roughan, Authorities] at 157.
41
Roughan, Authorities, ibid at 157.
42
Roughan, Authorities, ibid at 8.
43
See e.g., Horatia Muir-Watt, “Theorizing transnational authority: A private international law perspective” in
Roger Cotterrell & Maksymilian Del Mar, eds., Authority in Transnational Legal Theory: Theorising Across
Disciplines (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub, 2016) 325 [Muir-Watt, “Theorizing Transnational Authority”];
Schiff Berman, “Legal Pluralism”, supra note 37.
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contending and legitimate claims by disparate legal systems lies at the heart of the conflict of
laws project.
When compared to the supranational law projects such as the OECD’s Pillars’ implicit
effort to harmonize legal systems through countries’ benevolence and altruistic agreement, rather
than reconciliation of domestic legal regimes through critical legal analysis, the principled and
long-standing approach and utility of the conflict of laws discipline as a heuristic is more
normatively sound.
Unlike the supranational approaches, the reconciliatory approach manifest in tax treaties
employing COL/col principles acknowledges and supports the sovereignty of both contending
legal systems, imploring their reconciliation rather than demanding their harmonization. In tax
treaties’ latent observance of COL/col principles, tax treaties acknowledge the inevitable
encounter of countries’ legal systems on the terrain of international taxation, anticipate diverse
legal regimes, and support countries’ law-making sovereignty by permitting both legal systems
to remain intact, unchanged, and unharmonized even though one of the contending legal systems
prevails over the other contenders and applies in the circumstances. In this, tax treaties already
do what the supranational approaches intend to do by ascertaining a governing law, and do so
without costs to state sovereignty.
The following chapters demonstrate how tax treaties implicitly observe COL/col
principles to ascertain the governing law. Chapter 2 details the problems that can arise when
treaties do not provide means to ascertain governing law using the example of hybrid mismatch.
Chapter 3 explains the context and conceptual coherence of how tax treaties come to employ
COL/col to ascertain governing law. Chapter 4 sets out the specific COL/col principles latently
employed in the treaty provisions. Chapter 5 illustrates how COL/col principles are implicitly
observed in tax treaty distributive rules. Chapter 6 illustrates how COL/col principles are latent
in tax treaty anti-treaty shopping rules. This thesis concludes by emphasizing that to the extent
that supranational harmonization approaches endeavour to ascertain the governing law for tax
treaties, they are unnecessary because tax treaties already employ COL/col principles to do so
through reconciliation and thus without the costs to state sovereignty imposed by harmonization.
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2

Problem of No Governing Law in Tax Treaties

1.1. Problems When Governing Law Cannot Be Ascertained: Hybrid Mismatch
Ascertaining governing law and answering the question of ‘what is the nature of the transaction,
person, income, etc.?’ is essential for tax treaties to operate.44 “Hybrid mismatch” is an example
of how things go awry when contracting states cannot identify and agree on governing law. The
international tax community has struggled to ascertain governing law and answer the question of
‘what is the nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ regarding “hybrid mismatch”.
Hybrid mismatch is often conceived of as ‘aggressive’ tax planning, but it is deeper than this. It
is a governing law problem.
2.1.1

Meaning of ‘Hybrid Mismatch’

For the OECD, “hybrid mismatch” refers to arrangements implicating entities or instruments
“used in aggressive tax planning to exploit differences in the tax treatment of an entity or
instrument under the laws of two or more tax jurisdictions to achieve double non-taxation,
including long-term taxation deferral”.45 Fundamentally, hybridity is the result of multiple legal
perceptions of the same instrument, entity, event, or transaction spurring multiple tax outcomes
in and as a result of a multi-jurisdictional and multi-juridical world defined by its legal
heterogeneity. Hybrids may result in outcomes including deduction/non-inclusion, double
deduction, and indirect deduction/non-inclusion and can take the form of entities or
instruments.46

2.1.2

Hybrid Instruments

Convertible bonds are an example of a hybrid instrument “mismatch” of debt and equity features
that may give rise to a deduction/non-inclusion outcome. Consider two related companies:

44

Issues associated with ascertaining the applicable law arise in different case studies, e.g., taxation of digital
businesses; hybrid transactions involving entities and instruments varying degrees of transparency and opacity
depending on the borders involved; deductibility; transfer pricing; and the impact of choice of law clauses on treaty
shopping and the extent to which the choice of law clause is valid.
45
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Action 2: Neutralising the effects of hybrid mismatch
arrangements” (2019) Web: https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action2/ [OECD, “Action 2”].
46
See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch
Arrangements, Action 2 - 2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD, 2015) [OECD 2015 Hybrid Report].
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Company A based in France, and its related Company B based in Australia.47 French Company
A makes a payment to Australian Company B pursuant to a convertible bond. Convertible
bondholders receive fixed-income interest payments like creditors, but have the option to convert
the bond into shares at which time they would be equity-holders. As a result of its bond- or debtlike qualities, and its security- or equity-like qualities, payments made pursuant to a convertible
bond may be treated like deductible interest expenses in the jurisdiction of the payor, and taxfree dividends in the jurisdiction of the recipient. Under French domestic law, French Company
A’s payment is treated as interest and deductible for tax purposes. Under Australian law, the
payment is treated as a dividend and benefits from a tax exemption. The result is a deduction in
France without corresponding taxation in Australia. The convertible bond is a hybrid instrument
that allows the payment to be deducted from French taxable income, and not included in
Australian taxable income. Because France and Australia each apply their local law as the
governing law, each answer the question of ‘what is the nature of the transaction, person,
income, etc.?’ differently, resultantly characterize the instrument and payments thereto
differently, and subsequently treat the payments differently in the tax law. The convertible bond
gains its hybrid character because divergent laws simultaneously apply to characterize it, leading
it to be seen differently depending on which side of a state border the beholder is located on.
2.1.3

Hybrid Entities

Regarding hybrid entities, USA LLCs and partnerships are examples of hybrid entity mismatches
and ‘reverse’ hybrid entity mismatches respectively. USA LLCs are hybrid entities seen as
fiscally transparent for USA tax purposes and fiscally opaque for foreign tax purposes, i.e., being
treated as corporations in foreign jurisdictions.48 USA partnerships are considered reverse hybrid
entities such that they are fiscally opaque and a separate taxpayer for USA tax purposes, but are

47

The scaffolding for the Australia/France example included in this discussion comes from the OECD’s short video
at Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Action 2: Neutralising the effects of hybrid mismatch
arrangements”, Video: “Fighting tax evasion: How to end hybrid mismatch arrangements” (2019) Web:
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action2/ [OECD, “Action 2” video].
48
Similarly, but in the reverse, Nova Scotian, British Columbian, and Albertan corporate law regime provides for
the creation of “unlimited liability companies” or “ULCs” which are treated as corporations for Canadian tax
purposes and partnerships for USA tax purposes. In Alberta, see Business Corporations Act, RSA. 2000, c B-9, s
15.2; In Prince Edward Island, see Business Corporations Act, RSPEI 1988, c B-6.01; In British Columbia, Business
Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57, s 51.3; In Nova Scotia, see Companies Act, RSNS 1989, c 81, s 135.
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fiscally transparent in foreign jurisdictions depending on its ‘check-box’ election49 pursuant to
regulations to be treated as corporation for USA tax purposes. The effect is taxation in the
jurisdiction where the entity is opaque, and non-taxation in jurisdiction where the entity is
transparent. The opaque entity may transfer much of what would otherwise be its income to its
related transparent entity. If the opaque entity has no taxable income in the jurisdiction by virtue
of transfers to a transparent entity in another jurisdiction, there will be no tax levied in the
jurisdiction of opacity because there is no income, and no tax levied in the jurisdiction of
transparency because the income is in the hands of an entity not recognized as a taxable person.
Because the USA and its counterpart each apply their local law as the governing law, each
answer the question of ‘what is the nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ differently,
resultantly characterize the entity and income thereto differently, and subsequently treat the
income differently in the tax law. USA LLCs and partnerships gain their hybrid character
because divergent laws simultaneously apply to characterize them, leading them to be seen
differently depending on which side of a state border the beholder is located on.
2.1.4

Problem of Hybrid Instrument and Entity Mismatch

The problematized tax consequences that arise because of hybrid entity and instrument mismatch
occur because of countries’ inability to determine what the governing law for determining the
character of the transaction is considering their two different perceptions. Concurrent perceptions
and applicable legal regimes lead to different treatment of the same event. At the core of the
hybrid instrument and entity mismatch is an inability of contracting states to settle on one
governing law, and subsequently, one perception of what the transaction is. If they could settle
on one governing law, they could settle on one perception, with congruent tax treatment across
borders being more likely.
Leaving aside hybridity’s negative connotations and understanding it in essential terms,
‘hybrid mismatch’ is a microcosm for the international tax environment and the dynamics at play
within it. In the hybrid context, when the conflict of tax laws which gives rise to hybridity
materialize, the first question should be, ‘how does each country legally see the transaction, and
if different, whose legal perception should carry the day?’. This question is of particular

49

Via IRS Form 8831, Entity Classification Election.
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importance because tax treaties, including Articles 1, 23A, and 23B of the 2017 OECD Model
Tax Treaty do not respond to hybrid instruments.

2.1.5

Governing Law Indicated for Hybrid Entity Mismatch

In the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, the purpose of Article 1(2) is to address partnerships and
other entities or arrangements that create whole or partial fiscal transparency. The OECD revised
Article 1(2) in the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty to reflect this purpose pursuant to
investigation on neutralizing the effects of hybrid entity mismatch.50 The OECD Committee on
Fiscal Affairs report, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships
(“OECD 1999 Partnerships Report”)51 the Committee expressed particular concern with “cases
where domestic tax laws create intermediary situations where the partnership is partly treated as
a taxable unit and partly disregarded for tax purposes”.52 The OECD commentary to Article 1(2)
is explicit that Article 1(2) responds to the OECD 1999 Partnership Report and “confirms the
conclusions of the report in such a case”, i.e., being non-taxation of income where neither
contracting states finds the income to belong to one of its residents.53 In this, Article 1(2)
implicitly acknowledges hybrid mismatch comes from the simultaneous application of two
heterogenous legal regimes each applying a legal characterization about what it means to be a
resident, with gaps in between. In acknowledging the problem arises from the encounter of
different legal regimes, Article 1(2) latently acknowledges a governing law problem.
Article 1(2) concerns how income should be taxed in circumstances of fiscal transparency
by indicating governing law as the law of the place where the person behind the fiscally
transparent entity is located. Article 1(2) provides that:
[I]ncome derived by or through an entity or arrangement that is treated as wholly or partly fiscally
transparent under the tax law of either Contracting State shall be considered to be income of a resident of a
Contracting State but only to the extent that the income is treated, for purposes of taxation by that State, as
the income of a resident of that State.54
50

Per OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23, M-7, para 2 was added to the 21 November 2017 version
following the OECD 2015 Hybrid Report, supra note 46.
51
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, The Application of the
OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (Paris: OECD, 1999) [OECD 1999 Partnership Report].
52
OECD 1999 Partnership Report, ibid at 37.
53
Commentary to Article 1(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23, C(1)-2).
54
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid, art 1(2) (emphasis added). The UN Model Tax Treaty, supra note 24, art
1(2) contains identical wording. For the effects of changes in the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty affecting
partnerships, see: Brian Arnold in Cooperation with the IBFD’s Tax Treaty Unit, “Hybrid Entities and the OECD
Model (2017): The End of the Road?”, IBFD Bulletin for International Taxation (July 2018) 417.
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Article 1(2) responds to hybrid entity mismatch by effectively looking through the hybrid entity
and attributing income earned through it to the resident behind the fiscally transparent entity or
arrangement. In Example 3, the OECD 1999 Partnership Report discussed instances where
neither contracting state finds the income generated to belong to one of its residents, leaving all
or part of it untaxed in either contracting state.55 “Confirm[ing] the conclusions of the [OECD
1999 Partnership] report,” the commentary to Article 1(2) sets a method for taxing the income. It
directs that “the reference to “income derived by or through an entity or arrangement” has a
broad meaning and covers any income that is earned by or through an entity or arrangement,
regardless of the view taken by each Contracting State as to who derives the income for domestic
tax purposes and regardless of whether or not that entity or arrangement has a legal personality
or constitutes a person as defined in [Article 3(1)(a)]”.56 Included in this broad definition is, for
example, “income of any partnership or trust that one or both of the Contracting States treats as
wholly or partly fiscally transparent”, and even fiscally transparent entities established in a third
state.57 The term “income” also has a broad meaning.58 Employing broad definitions of both
entities or arrangements and the income they earn, the effect of Article 1(2) is that income of
fiscally-transparent entities is attributed to the resident of one of the contracting states,59
effectively looking through the fiscally transparent entity to the resident of the contracting state
that sits behind it. The effect of Article 1(2) enables operation of other distributive rules in the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty.60
The OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty’s proposed treatment of hybrid entities including but
not limited to partnerships in Article 1(2) is an example of how the OECD acknowledges
instances of tax system encounter as a governing law problem and proposes resolution of the
problem by locating governing law in the legal system with the closest connections. By
effectively looking through the fiscally transparent entity and attributing broadly-defined
“income” to the resident sitting behind the fiscally transparent entity or arrangement,61 the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty drives toward the legal system where the entity, arrangement, or
55

OECD 1999 Partnership Report, supra note 51 at Example 3.
Commentary to Article 1(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23, C(1)-(4).
57
Commentary to Article 1(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid.
58
Commentary to Article 1(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid, C(1)-(4).
59
For illustration, see Example 2 in OECD 1999 Partnership Report, supra note 51.
60
Commentary to Article 1(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23, C(1)-6)
61
Commentary to Article 1(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid, C(1)-6)
56
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income has its closest actual ties, i.e., where the person behind the fiscally-transparent entity or
arrangement, pulling its strings, resides.
Canada and the USA approached hybrid entities in essentially the same way in Articles
4(6) and (7) of the Canada-USA Tax Treaty following the Fifth Protocol in 2007.62 The TD
Securities (USA) LLC v Canada63 (“TD Securities”) case is illustrative of why the shift to this
approach occured. TD Securities (USA) LLC (“TD LLC”) was a Delaware LLC, based in and
doing business in the USA with Canadian branch operations. The Canada Revenue Agency
(“CRA”) treated TD LLC as a corporation and it paid Canadian branch tax at the 25% domestic
rate, rather than the Canada-USA Tax Treaty rate of 5%. The USA tax authorities treated TD
LLC as a transparent entity and as a result its income was included in the income of USA
corporation TD Holdings II, its sole member. In turn, the income of TD Holdings II was included
in the consolidated return of its sole shareholder, TD USA.
The issue before the court was whether TD LLC should pay Canadian branch tax at the
domestic 25% rate or the treaty 5% rate. In answering this question, the court needed to
determine if TD LLC was a USA resident, as the treaty rate only applies to persons resident in
the USA.64
The Tax Court rejected the CRA’s position that LLCs including TD LLC were not
residents of the USA for the purposes of the treaty because the LLCs were treated as flowthroughs for USA tax purposes, and therefore not entitled to treaty benefits including the 5%
rate. The Tax Court held that the LLCs including TD LLC were residents for the purposes of the
Canada-USA Tax Treaty for the pre-Fifth Protocol periods. In coming to its conclusion, the Tax

62

Convention between Canada and the United States of America with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,
Canada and United States, 26 September 1980 as amended by the Protocols signed on June 14, 1983, March 28,
1984, March 17, 1995, July 29, 1997, and September 21, 2007 [Canada-USA Tax Treaty]; Protocol Amending the
Convention Between Canada and the United State of America With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital:
Annex B (Fifth Protocol, 21 September 2007) [Fifth Protocol].
63
TD Securities (USA) LLC v Canada, 2010 TCC 186 [TD Securities]; See discussion in Jinyan Li, Arthur
Cockfield, and J Scott Wilkie, International Taxation in Canada: Principles and Practices, 4th ed (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2018) [Li, Cockfield and Wilkie, International Taxation] at 73-75.
64
Cases from other jurisdictions include: Swift v HMRC, [2010] UKFT 88 (TC) where in the court weighed the
characteristics of partnerships and corporations on which the availability of the foreign tax credit turned (entities
characterized as partnerships had the opportunity to claim the foreign tax credit for members, whereas entities
characterized as corporations did not) when tasked with determining the application of the United kingdom's foreign
tax credit; Bayfine UK Products Bayfine UK v Revenue & Customs, [2008] UKSPC SPC00719, where
counterparties in derivative transactions or recognize this corporations under the UK tax law but not the USA tax
law and the significance of this difference for the purpose of the applicable treaty.
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Court adopted a contextual and purposive reading of the terms “resident” and “liable to tax”.65
The court derived the context and purpose of the treaty provisions by ascertaining the treatment
of other entities, including USA S corporations, partnerships, government entities, trusts,
charities, and pension funds, for the purposes of “residence” in the Canada-USA Tax Treaty. The
court also consulted the OECD 1999 Partnership Report and relevant commentary.66
The court held that TD LLC was entitled to treaty benefits because it is subject to
comprehensive taxation in that the USA “comprehensively taxes the worldwide income of TD
LLC as fully as if it had been earned by any other entity including a USA domestic
corporation”,67 by virtue of TD LLC’s income being included in the income of TD Holdings II,
whose income was subsequently included in TD USA's consolidated tax return.
Articles 4(6) and 4(7) of the Canada-USA Tax Treaty are a practical interpolation of the
OECD 1999 Partnership Report and deviation from the result in TD Securities. These articles
were introduced by the Fifth Protocol, taking effect January 1, 2010.68 The Canada-USA Tax
Treaty Articles 4(6) and 4(7) reads:
6. An amount of income, profit or gain shall be considered to be derived by a person who is a resident of a
Contracting State where:
(a) the person is considered under the taxation law of that State to have derived the amount through an
entity (other than an entity that is a resident of the other Contracting State); and
(b) by reason of the entity being treated as fiscally transparent under the laws of the first-mentioned
State, the treatment of the amount under the taxation law of that State is the same as its treatment
would be if that amount had been derived directly by that person.
7. An amount of income, profit or gain shall be considered not to be paid to or derived by a person who is a
resident of a Contracting State where:
(a) the person is considered under the taxation law of the other Contracting State to have derived the
amount through an entity that is not a resident of the first-mentioned State, but by reason of the entity
not being treated as fiscally transparent under the laws of that State, the treatment of the amount under
the taxation law of that State is not the same as its treatment would be if that amount had been derived
directly by that person; or
(b) the person is considered under the taxation law of the other Contracting State to have received the
amount from an entity that is a resident of that other State, but by reason of the entity being treated as
fiscally transparent under the laws of the first-mentioned State, the treatment of the amount under the
taxation law of that State is not the same as its treatment would be if that entity were not treated as
fiscally transparent under the laws of that State.

65

Li, Cockfield and Wilkie, International Taxation, supra note 63 at 74.
TD Securities, supra note 63 at para 101.
67
TD Securities, ibid at para 96.
68
Fifth Protocol, supra note 62.
66
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The articles represent the countries’ respect for legal systems, but acknowledge their tax treaty
objectives, and use selection of a governing law via Articles 4(6) and 4(7) to deliver those
objectives.
The Canada-USA treaty is arguably Canada’s most important given the proximity of the
two nations and the extent to which the two economies rely on each other, particularly
considering Canada’s status as a small, open economy. The two countries have similar tax69 and
private legal systems, and engage in substantial trade with each other.70 In this context with
much on the line, the contracting states have explicitly considered that both of their laws may
apply and come into conflict, and opted that one of them shall take priority as the governing law
to neutralize the effect of hybrid entity mismatch.
Article 1(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty and Articles 4(6) and (7) of the
Canada-USA Tax Treaty indicates governing law in respect of hybrid entities, but does not deal
with hybrid instruments.
2.1.6

No Governing Law Indicated for Hybrid Instrument Mismatch

Usually, in questions of which countries’ law should apply for the purposes of the other country
granting exemption or credit to the other, Articles 23A and 23B71 of the OECD 2017 Model Tax
Treaty step in. In the instance of hybrid instrument mismatch, it does not do so. Generally, there
are two kinds of conflicts that can arise as contracting states seek the allocative outcomes of their
tax treaties: “qualification” conflicts, and “classification” conflicts.72
2.1.6.1 Qualification Conflicts
Qualification conflicts result where both countries agree their tax treaty applies to the event from
which income was generated, but because of differences in the treaty countries’ domestic laws,

69

While Canada and the United States have similar recognitions between the tax and legal systems, a substantial
difference between the Canadian and USA tax system is that the USA allows selective/elective/choice of legal
constructions through an elective regime via IRS Form 8831, Entity Classification Election.
70
Canada’s exports to the United States are worth $336,215 million and a partner share of 75.37% in 2019.
Canada’s imports from the United States are worth $229,986 million and a partner share of 50.73% in 2019. See
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Canada” web: https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada;
World Integrated Trade Solution, “Canada exports, imports, tariff by year”, web:
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CAN/Year/LTST/Summarytext.
71
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23, arts 23A and 23B.
72
See the commentary to Article 23A and 23B at OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid at C(23)-1 through C(23)(37).
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each believe that a different provision or income category of their treaty applies. For example,
based on the contracting states’ differing domestic law regarding employment versus
independent contractor, one contracting state may qualify the income as income from
employment, whereas the other might qualify it as income from business.
For qualification conflicts, notwithstanding the different articles of the treaty the
contracting states purport to be taxing the amounts in accordance with, the OECD 2017 Model
Tax Treaty provides an answer for how they should resolve their disagreement and decide whose
determination of the treaty provision applicable carries the day. The rules to resolve qualification
conflicts appear in the specific income articles themselves, or in Article 23A or 23B. Article 23A
and 23B offer internal and self-executing resolution mechanisms prescribing if the residence
country or source country should provide an exemption or credit where amounts are “being taxed
in accordance with the Convention”.73 In circumstances of qualification conflict, the income is
technically being taxed in accordance with the convention in both countries even if the countries
cannot agree on which of the two articles apply. This is because no matter which of the
contending articles turns out to apply, either article is correct at the contracting states’ respective
domestic laws and lawful under their treaty. Income is still being “taxed in accordance with the
Convention” even if countries consider different articles of the convention to apply. As such,
taxation will be in accordance with the convention in any event of the qualification conflict. The
commentary to the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty provides:74
32.1 Both Articles 23 A and 23 B require that relief be granted, through the exemption or credit method, as
the case may be, where an item of income or capital may be taxed by the State of source in accordance with
the provisions of the Convention. Thus, the State of residence has the obligation to apply the exemption or
credit method in relation to an item of income or capital where the Convention authorises taxation of that
item by the State of source.
…
32.3 Different situations need to be considered in that respect. Where, due to differences in the domestic
law between the State of source and the State of residence, the former applies, with respect to a particular
item of income or capital, provisions of the Convention that are different from those that the State of
residence would have applied to the same item of income or capital, the income is still being taxed in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, as interpreted and applied by the State of source. In such
a case, therefore, the two Articles require that relief from double taxation be granted by the State of
residence notwithstanding the conflict of qualification resulting from these differences in domestic law.

73

Commentary to Article 23A and 23B at OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23 at C(23)(15) - C(23)(17) at
paras 32.3 and 32.5.
74
Commentary to Article 23A and 23B at OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid at C(23)(15)-C(23)(16) at paras 32.1
and 32.3 with an example at para 32.4.
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In effect, contending claims of contracting states are resolved through black-letter rules
prescribing the governing law and thus whose qualification applies and what the other state
should do given that finding.
2.1.6.2 Classification Conflicts
Classification conflicts or “conflicts of interpretation”,75 including hybrids are not provided
black-letter rules to ascertain the governing law. These kinds of conflicts result from “different
interpretation of facts or different interpretation of the provisions of the Convention”.76 The
commentary reads:77
32.2 The interpretation of the phrase “may be taxed in the other Contracting State in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention”, which is used in both Articles, is particularly important when dealing with cases where the State of
residence and the State of source classify the same item of income or capital differently for purposes of the provisions
of the Convention.
…
32.5 Article 23 A and Article 23 B, however, do not require that the State of residence eliminate double taxation in all
cases where the State of source has imposed its tax by applying to an item of income a provision of the Convention that
is different from that which the State of residence considers to be applicable. For instance, in the example above, if, for
purposes of applying paragraph 2 of Article 13, State E considers that the partnership carried on business through a
fixed place of business but State R considers that paragraph 5 applies because the partnership did not have a fixed place
of business in State E, there is actually a dispute as to whether State E has taxed the income in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention. The same may be said if State E, when applying paragraph 2 of Article 13, interprets the
phrase “forming part of the business property” so as to include certain assets which would not fall within the meaning
of that phrase according to the interpretation given to it by State R. Such conflicts resulting from different interpretation
of facts or different interpretation of the provisions of the Convention must be distinguished from the conflicts of
qualification described in the above paragraph where the divergence is based not on different interpretations of the
provisions of the Convention but on different provisions of domestic law. In the former case, State R can argue that
State E has not imposed its tax in accordance with the provisions of the Convention if it has applied its tax based on
what State R considers to be a wrong interpretation of the facts or a wrong interpretation of the Convention. States
should use the provisions of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), and in particular paragraph 3 thereof, in order
to resolve this type of conflict in cases that would otherwise result in unrelieved double taxation.

As the commentary describes, when classification conflicts arise, from the perspective of each
contracting state, the income is not being taxed in accordance with the convention by the other
state because each contracting state believes the other contracting state has wrongly ascertained
75

To take the term used by Jacques Sasseville in Sasseville, “Schrödinger’s Cat”, supra note 33 at 46. Wilkie
engaged Sasseville’s “Schrödinger’s Cat” as a metaphor for the source of income question in Scott Wilkie, “New
Rules of Engagement? Corporate Personality and the Allocation of “International Income” and Taxing Rights” in
Brian Arnold, ed, Tax Treaties After the BEPS Project: A Tribute to Jacques Sasseville (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 2018) 349 [Wilkie, “Corporate Personality and Allocation].
76
Commentary to Article 23A and 23B at OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23 at C(23)(15) - C(23)(17) at
paras. 32.3 and 32.5.
77
Commentary to Article 23A and 23B at OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, ibid at C(23)(15)-C(23)(16) at paras 32.2
and 32.5.
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the facts or wrongly interpreted the treaty. At that moment, two legal systems apply with
discordant results before their mutual exclusivity is realized. Jacques Sasseville describes these
conflicts as akin to Schrödinger’s cat, where in the face of two quantum mechanical events,
neither yet materialized, a cat could be simultaneously alive and dead at the same time.78
If contracting states did not include internal treaty rules in their bargain to direct whose
law should apply as the governing law to answer the question of ‘what is the nature of the
transaction, person, income, etc.?’, how should the applicable law be ascertained? Which of the
contracting states has the authority to decide the facts of the transaction, driving the conclusion
on the proper interpretation and application of the treaty terms?
For classification conflicts, Article 23A and 23B provide only a process for resolution.
Where amounts are not “being taxed in accordance with the Convention,” Article 23A and 23B
point to Article 25 which offers the resolution process of the Mutual Agreement Procedure.79 If
countries do no accept the Panel’s decision, the two legal systems continue apply with discordant
results, their mutual exclusivity necessary for the treaty to function never realized. As Jacques
Sasseville notes, “if quantum mechanics resulted in a cat being both alive and dead at the same
time, this would be a rather counter-intuitive result”.80 The convention does not provide a
mechanism, framework, or principled approach to be employed for the resolution of
classification conflicts in Mutual Agreement Procedure negotiations. Contending claims of
contracting states are resolved through negotiations by tax authorities, i.e., Competent
Authorities.81 Mutual Agreement Procedure proceeds on the assumption that both countries have
legitimate legal grounds for asserting the application of respective domestic laws. Neither
country is required to defer or concede to the claim of the other, as in Raz’s conception.82 Absent

78

Sasseville, “Schrödinger’s Cat”, supra note 33 at 48. See also Rebecca Kysar, “Interpreting Tax Treaties” (2016)
101:4 Iowa L Rev 1387, especially, “IV.E.1. Domestic Law”, at 1413, describing the case of Boulez v
Commissioner, 83 TC 584 (1984) (USA) where the issue was if payments for musical performances in the USA
were royalties taxable in Germany, or compensation for personal services taxable in the USA. Germany and the
USA applied divergent characterizations of the payments. Art 3(2) of the USA-Germany tax treaty could not resolve
the conflict because each country asserted its claim on the basis of source and residence respectively. The USA
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compulsion, compromise is required. Competent authorities negotiate their countries’ respective
deviations from applying its own law, however legitimately, and instead devise bespoke
governing law to apply to the circumstances.83
Absent the circumstantial creation of bespoke law, it is unclear which of the contending
contracting states’ law should apply as the governing law to answer the question of ‘what is the
nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ in a classification conflict. There is no natural,
universal law of relationships, entities, instruments, transactions, or persons to look to for an
answer to this question,84 so harmonization or reconciliation is necessary.
2.1.7

International Responses to Hybrid Instrument Mismatch

Considering the problematized tax consequences of e.g., transparency and opacity85 resulting in
hybrid instrument versus entity mismatch scenarios flowing from the encounter, interaction, and
potential conflict of countries’ tax laws and therefore legal systems, and the fact that the treaty
does not provide an answer, international guidance has emerged.
The OECD has spearheaded extensive research on hybrid mismatch to neutralize the
effects of heterogeneous legal and factual perceptions of events. The OECD considers hybrid
mismatch a significant issue because of its role in tax base erosion in concerned jurisdictions and
how its widespread prevalence magnifies such effects.86 An early acknowledgement by the
OECD of the risks and effects of hybrid mismatch appeared in its 2010 report, Addressing Tax
Risks Involving Bank Losses (“OECD 2010 Bank Losses Report”)87 concerning the international
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banking context,88 noting revenue authorities should “bring to the attention of their government
tax policy officials those situations which may potentially raise policy issues, and, in particular,
those where the same tax loss is relieved in more than one country as a result of differences in
tax treatment between jurisdictions, in order to determine whether steps should be taken to
eliminate that arbitrage/mismatch opportunity”.89 The OECD revisited the issue in its 2011
report, Corporate Loss Utilisation through Aggressive Tax Planning (“OECD 2011 Corporate
Loss Report”)90 wherein it recommended countries “consider introducing restrictions on the
multiple use of the same loss to the extent they are concerned with these results”.91
Various OECD countries conducted their own reviews and identified instance tax
planning through hybrids.92 The OECD subsequently released its 2012 report, Hybrid Mismatch
Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (“OECD 2012 Hybrid Report”)93 identifying
the effect of hybrid arrangements on tax revenues, their negative effect on efficiency,
transparency and fairness in tax systems, and their adverse effect on competition.94 While the
report could not identify which countries’ tax bases were eroded as a result of hybrid mismatch,
the report concluded that hybrid mismatch indeed put the collective tax base at risk. Among the
various policy options advanced to address hybrid mismatch scenarios, the report concluded that
“domestic law rules which link the tax treatment of an entity, instrument or transfer to the tax
treatment in another country had significant potential as a tool to address hybrid mismatch
arrangements”.95
The OECD’s most recent dedicated study of the topic is the OECD’s Action 15 Report,
Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Action 2: 2015 Final Report, released in 2015
(“OECD 2015 Hybrid Report”).96 The OECD’s 2015 Hybrid Report builds on the OECD's 2012
Hybrid Report by setting out the domestic law linking rules touted as promising in the OECD’s
2012 Hybrid Report. The OECD 2015 Hybrid Report advocates neutralizing hybrid mismatch
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through countries enacting these linking rules via changes to their domestic tax laws.97 The
linking rules include domestic hybrid financial instrument rules,98 disregarded hybrid payments
rules,99 reverse hybrid rules,100 deductible hybrid payments rules,101 dual-resident payer rules,102
and imported mismatch rules.103 The rules are organized into a hierarchy based on tie-breakers
to ensure jurisdictions do not apply different rules concurrently and create confusion. “The report
recommends that every jurisdiction introduce all the recommended rules so that the effects of
hybrid mismatch arrangements are neutralized even if one of the other jurisdictions does not
have effective hybrid mismatch rules”.104
The planned combined effect of the rules is to align tax outcomes across jurisdictions.
The OECD’s 2015 Hybrid Report advocates that countries can achieve the effects of common
legal or factual perception of events, transactions, and instruments, and eliminate deduction/noninclusion, double deduction, and indirect deduction/non-inclusion, even if they do not truly share
the same actual legal or factual perception or characterization of events in their domestic laws.
The report does not target harmonization of corporate, commercial, or regulatory law outcomes,
discordance of which across jurisdictions gives rise to hybridity.105 Rather, the report focuses on
aligning the tax treatment of hybrid scenarios. This is accomplished by effectively harmonizing
tax systems so deductions are allowed or disallowed on similar grounds across different
countries. Chapters 2 and 5 of the OECD 2015 Hybrid Report advocates the following
harmonization:106 denial of dividend exemptions and equivalent relief from economic double tax
regarding deductible payments made pursuant to financial instruments; introduction of measures
to prevent the use of hybrid transfers to duplicate credits for withholding taxes at source;
alteration of the effect of controlled foreign corporations and other offshore investment regimes
so that hybrid entities’ income comes under the charge to tax of the investor jurisdiction;
adoption by countries of information reporting and filing requirements concerning tax
transparent entities established in the reporting country’s jurisdiction; restriction on the tax
97
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transparency of reverse hybrids that are members of a control group; and implementation of
hybrid mismatch rules that adjust tax outcomes in one jurisdiction to accord with the tax
outcomes in another jurisdiction in the event of a hybrid mismatch arrangement in order to
reduce deduction/non-inclusion, double deduction, or indirect deduction non-inclusion outcomes.
After the release of the OECD’s final Action 2 recommendations in the OECD 2015
Hybrid Report, some countries involved in the Inclusive Framework adopted comprehensive
rules to address the effects of a wide range of hybrid mismatch and branch mismatch, echoing
those rules in the OECD’s 2015 Hybrid Report.107 The United Kingdom (“UK”), Australia, and
New Zealand passed legislation reflecting the common approach prescribed by Action 2.108 The
USA, occupying a sometimes-antagonistic role among OECD countries, issued regulations to the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act109 to clarify the application of hybrid mismatch rules.110
The EU’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive II111 bears much similarity to the OECD’s 2015
Hybrid Report. ATAD II expands and provides rules for hybrid permanent establishment
mismatch, hybrid transfers, hybrid financial mismatches, dual resident mismatches, reverse
hybrid entity mismatch, and imported mismatches. ATAD II applies where there is corporate tax
liability, a structured mismatch arrangement, and effective control in a hybrid context. It targets
deduction/non-inclusion and double deduction outcomes. ATAD II operates through a “primary
rule” and a “secondary rule”. Under the primary rule, the mismatch is neutralized by the state of
the payer denying the deduction. If the primary rule is not applied, the secondary rule allows the
state of the receiver to add the amount of the payment to the receiver’s taxable income.112 The
member states of the EU adopted ATAD II and countries must have brought the hybrid mismatch
rules into effect by early-2020.
The OECD’s 2015 Hybrid Report and ATAD II take the (correct, as will be discussed
later) position that differences between local regimes is the cause of different, or “mismatching”
characterizations, giving rise to the hybrid mismatch problem. In response, the OECD’s 2015
Hybrid Report and ATAD II articulate a domestic tax law harmonization effort targeted at
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creating uniform tax treatment of a transaction, event, or instrument. The approach in both
instances of international direction is to neutralize the effects of different, or “mismatching”
characterizations by neutralizing the effects of differences in local regimes from which they
result through homogenous tax laws across borders, i.e., enacting common understandings about
how and when to allow or disallow deductions or take defensive action in the face of states’
passivity on hybrid issues. This is plain in both instances of international guidance emphasizing
countries change their domestic laws to accord with a coordinated effort toward legal system
homogeneity.
The OECD is explicit that the solution to the lack of coordination in the two countries’
laws is domestic law changes.113 For example, in the double deduction context, the BEPS project
calls for countries to deny the tax exemption for payments that are deductible in another
jurisdiction, and if this does not happen, the country wherein the deduction would otherwise be
enjoyed will neutralize the mismatch by denying the deduction claimed by the payer.114 ATAD II
is similarly explicit.
The 2015 OECD Hybrid Report and ATAD II stress the importance of having a consistent
answer to the question, ‘what is the nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ and an effort
to determine governing law by all involved countries having the same law. While the 2015
OECD Hybrid Report and ATAD II do not seek countries legislate uniform perceptions of, for
example, debt and equity, or partnerships and corporations, they do seek entities or instruments
with the hallmarks of hybridity to receive uniform tax treatment across a network of nations.
Both the 2015 OECD Hybrid Report and ATAD II acknowledge that until the contracting states
arrive at a common response to hybridity, the tax outcomes, gaps, and consequences resulting
from countries’ different characterizations of transactions and amounts paid pursuant to them
will persist.
Both instances of international guidance view domestic tax law as by, of, and unto itself
and thus propose domestic tax law harmonization to relieve hybrid mismatch. Hybrid mismatch,
like all instances of international tax encounter, is first and foremost a legal problem. A hybrid
instrument mismatch arises from two simultaneous and concurrent legal characterizations of a
payment made pursuant to an instrument existing simultaneously and therefore attracting
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different and “mismatching” tax treatment. The OECD 2015 Hybrid Report and ATAD II
acknowledge that differences between local regimes is the cause of different, or ‘mismatching’
characterizations, giving rise to the hybrid mismatch problem. While true, is tax system
harmonization, contingent on countries’ political negotiation115, benevolence and even
altruism,116 the answer? Is tax system harmonization the only answer, and given the implications
of systemic harmonization and the presence of viable and predictable alternatives, the necessary
answer?117
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3
3.1

Context
Solving Legal Problems with Legal Tools

Legal problems should be solved with legal frameworks to glean legal determinations. On this
point, Lord Andrew Burrows of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (as he is now)
wrote:118
In re-invigorating private law research, it seems to me essential that the merits of rigorous doctrinal
analytical research on case law and legislation should be re-emphasized. In other words, rather than seeing
the cure to reviving private law as lying in a replacement of traditional doctrine by, for example, deep
philosophical or sociological theory it is my view that practical legal scholarship including comparative law
should be applauded not derided.

The OECD’s reliance on political negotiation119 and states’ altruism,120 i.e., urging countries to
initiate domestic tax law reform with normative aims, rather than employing a principled legal
framework in the pursuit of governing law, despite it being an imminently “legal” problem is
precisely what Lord Burrows cautioned against. Considering such cautionary calls, investigation
into the legal problem and dynamics underlying conflicts of tax laws and the search for
governing law in tax treaties is a fruitful path to approaching it in a more principled way.
3.2

Tax Law as Accessory to Domestic Private Law

Conflicts of tax law arise because countries concurrently apply their domestic laws giving rise to
different legal characterizations of the same event, person, income, etc., and then subsequently
treat the event, person, income, etc., differently for domestic tax law purposes, causing a clash.
Tax law is accessory to private law.121 Wilkie and Hogg write of tax as an accessory to the
domestic law, such that tax law looks to inter alia the private law characterizations of entities,
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instruments, relationships, events, persons, etc., as at the very least a starting place to calibrate
tax outcomes.122 Wilkie and Hogg write:
Tax law, the framework for imposing tax and achieving the objectives served by a tax system, generally
requires a tax subject (the taxpayer), a tax object (an item of property, a service, or some other
manifestation of value) that the tax law defines or that is defined by the underlying private law to which the
tax law is accessory, and a tax “realization event” (commonly associated with a “disposition” or some other
reckoning event by which the tax system brings to account the value of a tax object in relation to a tax
subject).123

The legal characterizations provided by domestic private law areas such as corporate law,
property law, trust law, etc. are essential inputs to the tax law for arriving at determinations of
tax outcomes. The corporate law serves up a characterization based on, for example, the
applicable corporate statute and jurisprudence, and on that pretense, the tax law applies to effect
a tax outcome.
On the domestic stage, the Canadian ITA illustrates how tax law is an accessory to
domestic private law. By virtue of the constitutional division of powers, Canada’s provinces
maintain legislative power over corporate regulation, resulting in distinct and sometimes
different corporate statues in each province. While bearing many similarities, they have
important differences that can drive divergent tax outcomes when the federal ITA applies to
provincially divergent characterizations. Examples include the different tax treatment of
amalgamations depending on the different provincial statutes.124
On the international stage,125 the Canadian ITA also illustrates how tax is an accessory to
the domestic law. Not only does the ITA rely on domestic private law characterizations to drive
tax outcomes, but on foreign private law characterizations as well. The foreign tax credit rules in

122

Wilkie and Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System”, supra note 1. Tax systems do deviate from
consistent treatment of private law creations would defeat tax policy goals, e.g., the foreign tax credit generator
cases.
123
Wilkie and Hogg, “Tax Law Within the Larger Legal System”, ibid at 484.
124
See e.g., Anu Nijhawan and Gabrielle MR Richards, “Corporate Combinations: An Update on Canadian
Mergers”, 8 (2016) 2013 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2014) 1; Wendi P Crowe and
Tom L Senyk, “Amalgamation and Windup: What’s the Difference?” 2003 Prairie Provinces Tax Conference
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2003);
125
Other examples of how the tax outcome changes as a result of how the applicable private law characterizes the
event on the “international” stage include: the differences between the Canadian provinces’ corporate law statutes
driving different outcomes upon application of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA]; foreign affiliate
system, i.e., under the ITA’s foreign affiliate regime, treatment of dividends from foreign corporations depends on
the status of the corporation as a foreign affiliate and the nature of the income. For the foreign affiliate regime in this
context, see Li, Cockfield and Wilkie, International Taxation, supra note 63 at 269; see also Bill Holmes and Ian
Gamble, The Foreign Affiliate Rules (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer: 2020).

28

section 126126 exemplify ambulatory adoption of foreign private law to drive a Canadian
domestic tax outcome, the latter as accessory to the former even across state borders. Sections
126 and 91 essentially import the foreign private law characterization of an arrangement to
determine if that arrangement attracted tax in the foreign jurisdiction, and allows or disallows the
Canadian foreign tax credit on that basis.127 As Li, Wilkie, and Cockfeild write, “Canada has
effectively absorbed foreign private and tax law determinations on an ambulatory basis to
determine if there is foreign tax that should be recognized as an offset to Canadian tax”.128
Double tax relief through e.g., the foreign tax credit is necessary because Canadian
resident corporations and Canadian resident individuals are taxable on their worldwide income
from a source.129 If the corporation and the individual earn income from sources outside of
Canada, double taxation may result. In the interest of tax equity and neutrality, the ITA relieves
double taxation through the foreign tax credit,130 deductions for foreign tax,131 and exemption of
foreign income from Canadian tax.132
126
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Among these three methods, the foreign tax credit is the main mechanism for relieving
double taxation.133 The foreign tax credit operates so that a Canadian taxpayer’s Canadian
income tax in respect of foreign source income is reduced by the amount of foreign income tax
that person paid up to the amount of Canadian income tax owed.134 A Canadian taxpayer’s
Canadian income taxes are reduced by the amount of income taxes paid by the Canadian
taxpayer to foreign governments by allowing a credit against Canadian tax liability for foreign
taxes paid. The ITA, sections 91 and 126, will not grant a credit unless, based on the foreign
law’s characterization, tax was actually levied and paid in the foreign jurisdiction. If there was
no tax paid in the foreign jurisdiction, because under the foreign law, the entity, instrument,
relationship, etc. as characterized did not attract tax, the ITA will not provide for a credit.135
The foreign tax credit is available to Canadian resident taxpayers136 and non-resident
taxpayers who pay Part 1 tax on non-Canadian income from sources. The amount for which the
credit is sought must have been paid to a foreign government pursuant to an “income or profits”
tax. “Taxes” are “extracted under compulsion of law” and “collected as revenue to be used for
general public or government purposes”.137 While the term “income” is undefined in the ITA,
section 3 provides clues, i.e., income must have a source: office, business, employment, or
property. In order to determine if a foreign tax is an “income or profits tax”, the ITA implores
comparison of the scheme of application of the foreign tax to the scheme of application of
income and profits taxes imposed domestically under the ITA. If the basis of taxation for the
foreign tax is substantially similar, i.e., levied on net income or profits, it is an income or profits
tax.138 Sections 126(2) and 126(1) apply subsequently and respectively to credit “businessCanadian income for tax purposes, s 122.3 and 113(1)(a) directly or indirectly exempt foreign source income from
Canadian taxation via inclusion-then-deduction or credits.
133
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income tax” and “non-business-income tax”. “Business-income tax” is defined at section 126(7)
as “the portion of any income or profits tax paid by the taxpayer for the year to the government
of a country other than Canada that can reasonably be regarded as tax in respect of the income of
the taxpayer from a business carried on by the taxpayer in the business country”.139 “Nonbusiness-income” tax is defined in negative terms as including a foreign income or profits tax
that is not foreign business income tax and is not deductible under section 20(11) for the year,
e.g., tax on employment income, capital gains, passive investment income (i.e., dividends,
interest, royalties, and rent). The extent of the credit is limited by its “territorial source”, i.e., the
amount of Canadian tax payable on income earned in a foreign jurisdiction.140 Before the
taxpayer receives the foreign tax credit, the foreign tax must be “paid… for the year”, as per
section 126(1). Proof of payment is required.141
The foreign tax credit’s current form reflects a governmental response to ‘foreign tax
credit generators’.142 Foreign tax credit generator cases describe instances where Canada
provides a credit for foreign tax even though under the law of the foreign jurisdiction, foreign tax
was not paid. Foreign tax credit generators emerge where the tax treatment in the two countries,
i.e., the source country where the transaction takes place and the crediting country where the
taxpayer resides and seeks the foreign tax credit, are different. In the source country, the
classification of the arrangement as it happens in that source country does not attract tax
treatment at all, or by the end of the transaction. In the crediting country of taxpayer residence
however, the classification of the arrangement as it happened in the source country where the
transaction takes place would attract tax under the laws of the residence country. Accepting that
the arrangement happened in the source country, and concluding that the arrangement attracts tax
under the crediting countries law, the crediting country uses the foreign tax credit mechanism to
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credit tax in respect of an arrangement that, because it was never recognized as a taxable event in
the source jurisdiction, never attracted tax in the first place.
The Tax Court of Canada’s decision in 4145356 Canada Ltd v R143 (“RBC case”) was an
essential catalyst.144 In the case, a subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”) acquired
portions of a USA limited partnership based in Delaware for consideration of $400 million CAD.
Subsidiaries of the Bank of America also acquired a portion in the Delaware limited partnership
for a total consideration of $1.2 billion CAD.145 The USA limited partnership issued a loan worth
1.6 billion CAD to a third Bank of America subsidiary. On this loan, the USA limited
partnership earned approximately 38 million CAD in interest. The USA limited partnership
elected to be treated as a corporation for USA tax purposes. As a result, it paid USA income
taxes in the amount of $13 million CAD for the tax year in question. The USA limited
partnership then allocated $9 million to the RBC subsidiary, related to the portion the RBC
subsidiary had acquired initially, and subsequently deducted $3 million as a foreign tax credit,
representing the USA taxes the USA limited partnership paid. In the end, the RBC subsidiary
achieved net income of $6 million.
The CRA denied the RBC subsidiary’s claim for the foreign tax credit on the grounds
that the RBC subsidiary did not pay any USA taxes for which it now sought credit. The Tax
Court was tasked with determining whether the RBC subsidiary was entitled to claim the foreign
tax credit in the amount of $3 million for the USA income taxes it paid pursuant to subsection
126(2) of the ITA or Article 24(2) of the Canada-USA Tax Treaty.
The court allowed the foreign tax credit generator arrangement. Referring to section 96
and 126(2) of the ITA, Justice Webb interpreted the phrase “paid by the taxpayer” in subsection
126(2) broadly, such that the person paying versus liable for the taxes, i.e., the USA limited
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partnership and the RBC subsidiary respectively, need not be the same legal person. Justice
Webb noted that to deny the RBC subsidiary its claim to the foreign tax credit would result in
double taxation.
Foreign tax generators “are just another example of how tax and supporting legal and
accounting systems in fact are not homogeneous and do not necessarily mesh in the way that the
“international tax rules” of any one jurisdiction might expect is or should be the case”.146 Li,
Wilkie, and Cockfeild remark that “these sorts of transactions challenge the interpretation and
effect of foreign tax credit rules, and invoke questions of whether they involve unacceptable tax
avoidance according to a “general anti avoidance rule” or like anti-tax avoidance doctrine”. 147
Even though foreign tax credit generator cases showed that the opportunity existed for tax
avoidance, the general anti-avoidance rule (“GAAR”) or similar anti-tax avoidance doctrine were
not employed as a first resort. It became clear through the foreign tax credit generator cases that
the opportunity for avoidance was the symptom of a different problem, as can be inferred from
what the legislature did in response. The opportunity for avoidance was a symptom of multiple
domestic legal regimes applying to effect different tax treatment across countries classifying the
same event or transaction for tax purposes. If the problem is the mismatch of classification
occurring because of concurrent application of divergent legal regimes and characterization, with
the opportunity for avoidance as merely a by-product, the problem ought to be solved by
addressing the mismatch instead of reverting to anti-avoidance rules.
Li, Wilkie, and Cockfield identify one of the complex tax avoidance questions flowing
from the foreign tax credit provisions as demonstrated by the foreign tax generator cases as
being: “which countries’ terms of reference or law should be applied to characterize the
transaction or arrangement as insubstantial or artificial” and “whether one country -- crediting
country -- is permitted to determine the terms on or consequences with which another country’s
commercial and tax law apply for their own purposes”.148 In this respect, the RBC case is
essentially a private law conflicts decision from which the tax outcomes flow naturally. The Tax
Court determined that the Canadian ITA directed the conflicting Canadian and USA legal
characterizations be prioritized in a certain way and the conflict of tax laws resolved in a certain
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way. The tax results followed, and ultimately amounted to what the legislature deemed
unacceptable tax avoidance.
Parliament amended the foreign tax credit regime with the effect of eliminating multiple
mismatching characterizations by directing what the governing law for characterizing the income
in foreign tax credit claims would be, reducing the symptomatic opportunities for avoidance
through hybrids through legal rather than anti-avoidance means. The new legislation addressed
the problem of mismatching characterizations, and the symptomatic tax avoidance was resolved
subsequently. Now the foreign tax credit provisions at ITA sections, 126(4), 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 91(4.14.6) provide for an implied ambulatory adoption of the foreign private law to determine if the
characterization of the arrangement in the foreign legal system attracted tax for which Canada
should give credit.149 See subsections 126 (4.11) - (4.13) and supporting rules. Subsection
124(4.11) refers to the “relevant foreign tax law” (emphasis added).
(4.11) If a taxpayer is a member of a partnership, any income or profits tax paid to the government of a
particular country other than Canada — in respect of the income of the partnership for a period during
which the taxpayer’s direct or indirect share of the income of the partnership under the income tax
laws (referred to in subsection (4.12) as the “relevant foreign tax law”) of any country other than
Canada under the laws of which any income of the partnership is subject to income taxation, is less
than the taxpayer’s direct or indirect share of the income for the purposes of this Act — is not included
in computing the taxpayer’s business-income tax or non-business-income tax for any taxation year.

Subsection 124(4.11) shows how the foreign tax credit rules engage ambulatory adoption of
private law to make tax determinations. Partnership income may be taxed at the partnership level
in the USA. Partnerships are not taxable persons in Canada and partnership income is not taxed
at the partnership level in Canada. In Canada, partners bear tax in their capacity as singular tax
units, i.e., individuals, corporations, etc., proportionate to their ownership, share, etc. in the
partnership. In respect of USA taxes paid by the partnership to be credited under the Canadian
foreign tax credit, Canadian tax authorities looks to see how the USA tax authorities have
characterized the arrangement under USA corporate private law. Finding the USA has
characterized the arrangement as a partnership under USA corporate private law and that
characterization has attracted tax, Canada will accept the USA characterization of the
arrangement as a partnership and the USA tax outcome associated with it. Accepting that the
149
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characterization attracted a foreign tax, Canada will give credit for USA taxes paid up to the
amount of Canadian taxes owing. The USA tax determination, and thus the underlying private
legal system that gave rise to it, is ported into Canadian statutory interpretation context to
determine the Canadian tax outcome.
The Department of Finance’s technical notes describe these changes as to “address tax
schemes established by taxpayers with the intent of creating foreign tax credits and similar
deductions for foreign tax, the burden of which is not, in fact, borne by the taxpayer”.150 The
legislative changes thus limit foreign tax credits where the taxpayer is considered to have a
smaller interest in the foreign income under the foreign law compared to the interest in the
foreign income it would have under the Canadian law for Canadian tax purposes.
The Canadian foreign tax credit is an example of tax systems operating as accessory to
the domestic private law. The Canadian foreign tax credit mechanism relies on an ambulatory
adoption of, in this case, another country’s private law characterizations to come to domestic
conclusions about how the Canadian tax law should apply. The application of the foreign tax
credit is premised on whether Canada should concede its tax base in favor of another countries’
tax base. In answering this question, the ITA impliedly asks if under the foreign tax law, taking
all the elements important to foreign tax law including the surrounding foreign legal system in
which the foreign tax law is embedded into consideration, what the characterization of the
arrangement in the foreign jurisdiction is, and based on the characterization of the arrangement at
foreign law, if there was a foreign tax. The effect of this conceptual posture is that in Canada, the
availability of the foreign tax credit depends on if there has been a foreign tax. The foreign legal
characterization and tax outcome is imported for Canadian income tax interpretation purposes,
and the foreign tax credit is extended or denied on that basis.
Tax law is an accessory to the domestic private law and relies on private law
characterizations but only to the extent that the private law characterizes an event in accordance
with its fiscal significance of the private law in the context.151 Domestic private law drives tax
outcomes to the extent that the fiscal significance of the private law characterization is congruent
150
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across the taxation and private law contexts. Said another way, where the private law and the tax
law have the same objective in the situation, the tax system will generally take the private law
characterization and impose tax on its basis. If different, the tax law will adjust its outcome.
An example of such adjustment appears in the treatment of payments pursuant to
qualified preferred shares treated as interest rather than dividends in instances of perceived loss
transmission.152 The ITA treats dividends paid pursuant to ownership of certain qualified
preferred shares as interest because the purchase of the qualified preferred shares behaves more
like an extension of credit, with the payments pursuant thereto behaving more like interest, than
as purchase of equity, with the payments pursuant thereto behaving more like dividends. The tax
law accepts and acknowledges that the corporate law characterizes the payment as a dividend,
but declines to extend it the treatment ordinarily afforded to dividends given the fiscal
significance (or lack thereof) of the dividend in that situation. The dividend’s fiscal significance
(or lack thereof) does not accord with the ITA’s general anti-loss sale sentiment.153 The tax law
acknowledges and accepts the private law’s characterization but opts to treat the characterization
differently in order to achieve the tax goal. Even where the tax law deviates from treating all
private law characterizations of the same kind in the same way, the example of preferred shares
shows how domestic private law remains at the very least a useful point of first reference for the
determination of tax outcomes in the Canadian ITA, but from which the ITA will deviate if policy
priorities do not align.
The Canadian income tax system is full of examples of both domestic and foreign private
law being folded into domestic tax legislation to drive a domestic tax outcome. Canada’s
consultation and integration of private law characterizations into the tax law illustrate tax law as
an accessory to domestic law.

3.3

Conceptualizing Tax Treaty Disputes as a Conflict of Laws

Acknowledging that in the context of a digitized and globalized world economy, income is
connected to more than one tax jurisdiction that legitimately levies tax, and considering tax law
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is an accessory to the domestic law, overlapping tax claims result in the encounter of domestic
private legal systems. The fact of both countries applying tax necessarily means that the income
is being characterized by two (possibly different) legal systems because tax outcomes are derived
from private law characterization inputs.
Generally, domestic law is incorporated in the tax treaty context via treaty articles and
interpretive exercises included with them to inform outcomes under the article in question.
Considering there is no tax law without private law to act as its life-giving blood and structural
bones, any reference to tax law in a treaty or otherwise carries with it the private legal system in
which tax law is embedded, including most overtly characterizations of entities, instruments,
transactions, and events characterized at private law as a necessary precursor to determining their
tax status and treatment.
In globalized business transactions on small (e.g., your Amazon purchase) and large
scales (e.g., Coca-Cola’s intergroup contracts for IP and intangibles154), the fact that tax is
applied by both countries who the transaction touches mean that tax is bringing those legal
systems together to encounter one another. The fact that two or more countries both wield a tax
claim presents an occasion for the meeting of private legal systems on the terrain of that that
single income-generating event.
In any event of the new occasions for encounter and possibly conflict ushered in by
globalization and digitalization, the fact of the matter is that the same encounter of private legal
systems is happening in the tax context as in any other context. Taxation is a way that private
legal systems meet each other, similarly to how legal systems meet in other situations, such as in
contracts, car accidents, marriage and divorce, etc., where the subjects or objects of legal rules
straddle nation state boundaries. Because tax law is an accessory to the domestic private law,
conflicting tax regimes signify an underlying conflict of domestic private legal regimes. COL/col
illuminates and animates the dynamics underscoring conflicts of tax law as tax treaty governing
law problems, which result from the concurrent application of two or more domestic legal
systems. Conflicts of tax law and the challenge of ascertaining governing law associated with
them arise because of lack of homogeneity across and between legal systems. The fact that tax
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law is an intermediary to this conflict of laws must not be allowed to obscure its true nature. It is
a conflict of private laws that is drawing tax regimes into conflict.
Kysar conceptualizes tax treaties as “jurisdictional overlays to the parties’ tax systems
and substantially rely on upon domestic law”, submitting tax treaties contemplate the inclusion
and ambulatory adoption of domestic law characterizations, as compared to other treaties,155
which do not to the same degree as in tax treaties. At 1411 she posits that tax treaties as
incomplete contemplate importation of domestic law, providing an enhanced role for domestic
law in tax treaties, consistent with but distinct from treaty interpretation norms generally. In any
event of the enhanced role of domestic law in tax treaties, Kysar acknowledges at 1402 that
interpretive approaches to tax treaties should not contradict general principles of treaty
interpretation at international law.
General principles of treaty interpretation at international law contained in the combined
operation of Articles 26, 27, 31 and 32 of the VCLT illustrate that treaty interpretation
endeavours to ascertain a single governing law out of more than one conceivable contender. All
treaties, including tax treaties, must comply with the articles of the VCLT. One of the
implications of the combined effect of Articles 26, 27, 31 and 32 of the VCLT is that countries
must not thwart the application of an otherwise legitimate treaty because their domestic laws
provide differently. Article 27 concerns “internal” law and observance of treaties, and provides
that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty” effectively foreclosing multiplicities of disparate legal regimes from applying.
Relatedly, Article 26 provides that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith”.156 Articles 31 and 32 provide general and
supplementary rules of treaty interpretation suggesting that countries are working toward one,
not many, interpretations of the treaties’ terms. Articles 26, 27, 31, and 32 VCLT prohibits
concurrent, disparate laws from applying to interpret the treaty, suggesting instead the pursuit of
one governing legal system through bespoke definitions or otherwise.
For the treaty to effectively allocate taxing rights to income, only one characterization
can carry the day. Recalling Jacques Sassville’s description of the metaphysics behind the
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classification dispute as a Schrödinger’s cat, two outcomes exist simultaneously before folding
into reality where only one is true and can be true.157 Sasseville’s illustration bears much
similarity to descriptions of the legal discipline, conflict of laws and its subset “choice of law”.
Before employing a COL/col analysis ascertain the governing law, both private laws of both
jurisdictions conceivably apply to the dispute. COL/col is the way in which the box is opened to
determine whether Schrödinger’s cat is alive or dead. Approaching conflicts of tax law from a
conflict of laws disciplinary mindset provides a means to glean the underlying dynamics to
challenges associated with ascertaining the governing law.
Public and private international law thematically converge.158 One such convergence is
that both legal disciplines pursue a single, legitimately-chosen (if chosen) domestic governing
law with the closest connections to the event in order to determine rights and obligations created
through bargains between parties across nations without displacing or altering the law of any of
the contenders. Michaels writes that in the face of legal fragmentation and conflicts between
legal orders, the best response is recourse to “the discipline that was made for that precise
purpose”.159 The conflict of laws discipline creates a platform for determination of what
happened legally, allowing a governing law to be ascertained and to not be thwarted by the
conflict.
3.4

Conflict of Laws Retaining Relevance in the ‘Borderless’ World

If conflict of laws describes the dynamics underscoring conflicts of tax law and the pursuit of
governing law when they arise, why then has the OECD declined to look to the discipline for
conceptual guidance when making its international recommendations? While the reasons cannot
be known with certainty, and in any event of the reasons, the OECD’s reliance on political
negotiation160 and possibly, states’ altruism,161 i.e., urging countries to initiate domestic tax law
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reform rather than employing a principled legal framework, is consistent with a trend in
transnational legal scholarship which moves away from private law study.162
Some transnational legal scholars query “whether the methodologies of private
international law can be used in any meaningful way in the context of transnational authority.”163
“Transnational authority” as theorized has many shifting and elusive faces,164 including and
especially multinational enterprises, dealt with in this thesis qua tax units. The notion is that
transnational non-state actors have risen to such prominence that their power rivals that of nation
states, and their transnational nature makes them unregulatable by the nation states within whose
purview regulation of business usually and historically fell.165
3.4.1

OECD Picking Up ‘Borderless’ World Paradigm

The OECD and UN approaches fall in line, deliberately or not, with a transnationalist scholarly
view that the nation state is growing increasingly obsolete because of the way digitalization and
globalization have rendered state borders less prescriptive. An example of such discursive
politics appears in the “two-pillar solution” proposed by the OECD IF on BEPS.166
In Pillar One, market jurisdictions in certain industries will tax residual profits via
destination-based cash flow taxes, or formulary apportionment, instead of the current
source/residence paradigm. Pillar One applies to multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) exceeding
certain turnover and profitability thresholds.167 New “special purpose” nexus rules allocate
“Amount A” to market jurisdictions from which a threshold of revenue is derived by the
MNE.168 Residual profits are allocated to market jurisdictions, i.e., “end market jurisdictions
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where the goods or services are used or consumed” based on revenue sourcing rules according to
the type of transaction.169 Resulting double taxation is to be resolved via exemption or credit.170
Pillar Two anticipates a global minimum tax by closing the door to low-tax incentives in
countries that employ them. According to the OECD, members’ agreement on Pillar Two
“indicates the ambition of the IF members for a robust global minimum tax with a limited impact
on MNEs carrying out real economic activities with substance”.171 Pillar Two applies to MNEs
that meeting certain thresholds determined by the standards of country by country reporting.172
Pillar Two is comprised of domestic Global anti-Base Erosion Rules (or “GloBE” rules,
themselves comprised of the Income Inclusion Rule (“IIR”) which taxes parent entities in respect
of income earned by subsidiaries taxed at a low rate, and the Undertaxed Payment Rule
(“UTPR”) to deny deductions or impose adjustments to catch low-tax income not caught by the
IIR, each with a minimum rate of 15%173) and a treaty based rule “that allows source
jurisdictions to impose limited source taxation on certain related party payments subject to tax
below a minimum rate”174 to derive an effective tax rate. Under this “common approach”,
members of the IF are “not required to adopt the GloBE rules, but, if they choose to do so, they
will implement and administer the rules in a way that is consistent with the outcomes provided
under Pillar Two, including in light of model rules and guidance agreed to by the IF” and “accept
the application of the GloBE rules applied by other IF members including agreement as to rule
order and the application of any agreed safe harbours”.175 The OECD contemplated Pillar Two
being “brought into law” in 2022 and effective 2023 through a model “subject to tax rule”,176
transitional rules, and possibly a multilateral instrument.177 Pillar Two focuses on what amounts
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to a global minimum corporate tax which in many ways appears to pre-empt the predicted death
of the nation state by subjugating local uses of tax expenditures.
Taking transnationalist scholarly predictions proclaiming the death of the nation state to
their natural and not so far-fetched extension,178 its ideological offspring is a narrative of the
irrelevance of legal structures and strategies that developed within and between those allegedly
obsolete nation states,179 i.e., national and bilateral mechanisms to reconcile competing tax
claims and therein the application of divergent legal systems

3.4.2

Borders Still Relevant

The nation state is not dead. The nation state remains a central authority interface and birthplace
of legal personhood,180 notwithstanding the proliferation of other authority interfaces and the
gaps in regulatory nets.181 The nation state cannot be obsolete when without it and its legal
system, the multinational corporation itself would not exist. Muir Watt writes that “giant
multinational corporations operating delocalized industries, leading the digital revolution [etc.]”
are “merely creatures of private law and subject as such to the ordinary private international law
tools and methods” and “still reminiscent in many ways of [their] pre-modern forms”.182 Muir
Watt maintains the multinational enterprise’s growth does not diminish the role to be played by
private international law, which includes conflict of laws. She writes:183
[A]fter all, private international law pre-dates the modern state; it evolved informally to govern the
competing ambitions of various entities, religious and secular, to extend their power over individuals with
links to several territorial or personal jurisdictions, according to the idea that some kind of distribution of
potentially overlapping authority was required.
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If the nation remains relevant, then so to do the legal structures and strategies that developed
within and between nation states, specifically tailored to mediate the behaviours of those within,
between, and across jurisdictions. Conflict of laws lives in domestic legal regimes that remain
relevant because the nation state remains relevant. While there are overarching international
agreements and conventions,184 conflict of laws analysis plays out in domestic terrains through
the decisions of local courts. The fact that there is no overarching, supreme legal order to deal
with domestic legal systems in conflict does not thwart their resolution.
Is de facto (in fact) or de jure (in law) harmonization necessary when conflicts of tax law
result from underlying conflicts of private law to which tax is accessory, and private
international law which governs private law conflicts, facilitates harmonious intersection of
multiple, divergent legal regimes without demanding their harmonization? In her recent book,
The Code of Capital, Katharina Pistor says ‘no’:
[T]he alternative to deliberate harmonization of laws through the political process is legal and regulatory
competition among states combined with private autonomy for the laws end users, who get to pick and
choose what is best for them. For this to work, countries do not need to engage in laborious legal
harmonisation projects regarding the contents of, say, contract or corporate law; They only need to put in
place conflict of laws rules that endorse the choices that private parties make. These rules have the
additional advantage that they are so arcane their passage ruffles few feathers in the day-to-day political
process.185

Scholars who are dismantling the notion that the nation state is obsolete and maintain the
relevance of structures such as COL/col that emanate from nations show that supranational legal
proposals that attempt to harmonize legal systems are not accurate responses to the current global
order.
Acknowledging the international legal context in which tax systems are operating, it is time
to rethink the necessity of the OECD’s supranational approach. COL/col principles already
effectively ascertain a governing law in way that respects the primacy of the nation state. Given
the adverse effect on state sovereignty that arise when the nation state is prematurely
disregarded, and that reconciliation approaches achieve the same result of ascertaining governing
law, reconciliation is preferrable to supranational harmonization.
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4

Meaning of Conflict of Laws “Choice of Law” Principles

In the conflict of laws discipline, no governing law means no contract. Contracts without a
governing law are “mere abstractions”.186 “Contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum”
and must be attached to an overarching and underlying legal system to give meaning and
parameters to the parties’ obligations.187 Governing law, or choice of law, animates the whole
contract because choice of law points to the legal system in which the contract is embedded, with
its intersecting statutes and jurisprudence, amounting to and itself animating a societal system of
e.g., implied rights obligations, legal logics, and defined terms.
The decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench in Kiener v Kiener188 (“Kiener”) illustrates
the point that historically, if the parties’ selection in a choice of law clause is valid, they are
taken to select the whole legal regime, not just the bits and pieces of it that serve them on a posthoc basis. Kiener was a family law case about the proceeds to be paid as spousal support
pursuant to a marriage agreement. The plaintiff husband undertook to pay support to the
defendant, his former wife. The plaintiff husband was resident in the UK and all of his assets
were located there. The defendant wife was located in the USA. The issue was whether the
plaintiff husband could discharge his obligations by paying support amounts net of withholding
taxes, or if he must pay amount gross including withholding taxes. The former spouses chose the
law of New Jersey as the governing law for their marriage contract. The court found the parties
had made a legitimate choice in selecting New Jersey law, and in so doing must be taken to have
understood the surrounding circumstances of the legal regime, i.e., that withholding taxes were
owing on transfers between UK payors and USA recipients. In this, the court found the recipient
defendant wife had implicitly agreed to accept the payments net of withholding taxes. The
plaintiff husband was not required to gross-up his support payments in order to discharge his
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obligations to pay spousal support under the marriage contract. If parties make a legitimate
choice of law clause, that choice animates the network of legal obligations, meanings, and terms
in which the contract is embedded.
International conventions on conflict of laws and choice of law are also illustrative of the
necessity of governing law. In Europe, the Rome Convention of 1980189 set out uniform choice of
law rules for contracts.190 Its provisions were amended and set down in the Rome I Regulation191
applying “in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and
commercial matters”.192 Article 3 details the nature and scope of parties’ autonomy to choose
governing law for their contracts. Article 4 contains choice of law rules where parties have not
chosen a governing law or their choice is not effective. The Rome I Regulation has “universal
application” and operates “whether or not it is the law of a Member State”193 who voluntarily
signs on. For all the countries that have joined the Rome I Regulation, it tells the courts of those
countries the rules for choice of law in contract.194 Joerges views the EU as a conflict of laws
regime.195
A governing law must be indicated, whether the parties expressly select their governing
law through a choice of law clause or impliedly select their governing law by virtue of their
contractual context, behaviour or intention.196 In conventional commercial contract cases in

189
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Canada, the necessity of ascertaining the governing law implores a choice of law analysis.197
First, identify and characterize the issue to which the foreign law applies, e.g., a contract.
Second, identify the choice of law rule, meaning the law of the place to which the contract has
the most connections either via express choice of law (e.g., parties’ choice of law or choice of
forum clause), implied choice of law (e.g., parties’ behaviour or ascertainable intention); and if
neither of these can be ascertained or sufficiently proved, “proper law of the contract” (e.g., legal
and factual connections of the contract to a jurisdiction).198 Third, ensure the choice of law is
legitimate, meaning bona fide (i.e., connected, and if not connected, not evasive), legal (i.e.,
lawful in the jurisdiction where the contract is being adjudicated), and not contrary to public
policy199 (e.g., not part of a scheme to break the laws of another country). Once determined,
foreign law must be established as a fact.200 Tax treaty distributive rules illustrate how tax
treaties employ COL/col principles to ascertain governing law as the law of the place to which
the contract has the most connections. Tax treaty anti-abuse rules demonstrate how tax treaties
employ the COL/col requirements that choices of law be bona fide, legal, and not contrary to
public policy.

4.1

Governing Law That is Most Connected to the Event

COL/col principles implore governing law be ascertained as the law of the jurisdiction that bears
the most connective ties to the circumstances. Connective ties may be established based on the
jurisdiction to which the contract bears the “closest and most real connections”, or whether the
contract primarily concerns land or persons which tip the scales in favour of one jurisdiction or
the other.
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4.1.1

Establishing Governing Law Based on Closest and Most Real Connection

Where the contract does not reveal a legitimate express or implied choice of law by the parties to
serve as an overwhelming connective factor, the court determines the choice of law.201
Determining the proper law of a contract employs a “objective” test established in the Australian
Bonython case:202 “the system of law by reference to which the contract was made or that with
which the transaction has its closest and most real connection”.203 The Supreme Court of Canada
adopted the Bonython test in Imperial Life Assurance Co of Canada v Colmenares.204 Under this
test, the court ascertains how the parties intended their contract to operate (and importantly, not
the law the parties intended to govern their contract) according to the law of the place to which
the contract has its closest and most real connections.205 Relevant factors include “legal factors”
including the style and legal concepts with which the contract was drafted, and geographic
factors including the place where the contract was made or was to be performed.206 Whether a
statute exists in one of the contending jurisdictions that would invalidate all or portions of the
parties’ contract does not a bear on the court's objective analysis, even though such a statute
would change the operation of the contract.207 The proper law of the contract is assessed as of the
time the contract was made and so factors considered are limited to the factors ascertainable at
the time the contract was made.208
The EU context reflects similar considerations in the Rome I Regulation, Articles 3 and
4.209 Article 3 sets out the nature and parameters of the parties’ freedom to choose the law that
governs their bargains. Article 4(3) and 4(4) deals with “[a]applicable law in the absence of
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choice”. If the circumstances fall outside of the specific choice of law rules listed in Articles 3(1)
or 3(2), Articles 4(3) and 4(4) provide as follows:210
3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely
connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall
apply.
4. Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the contract shall be
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected.

The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts (“OAS
Treaty”) makes similar provisions.211 Also called the Mexico Convention, the OAS Treaty was
signed by Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela to codify substantive choice of law
rules according to the primary principles of party autonomy, the proximity principle, and general
principles of international commercial law.212 Article 7 provides that the “contract shall be
governed by the law chosen by the parties” expressly or impliedly. Article 9 deals with instances
where the parties have not expressly or implied selected a governing law:
If the parties have not selected the applicable law, or if their selection proves ineffective, the contract shall
be governed by the law of the State with which it has the closest ties.
The Court will take into account all objective and subjective elements of the contract to determine the law
of the State with which it has the closest ties. It shall also take into account the general principles of
international commercial law recognized by international organizations.
Nevertheless, if a part of the contract were separable from the rest and if it had a closer tie with another
State, the law of that State could, exceptionally, apply to that part of the contract.

In diverse legal contexts the governing law, absent parties’ legitimate choice, is the law of the
place to which the contract or event has the most connections.
4.1.2

Establishing Governing Law Based on Character of Event

Central to the conflict of laws discipline are the concepts of in rem and in personam jurisdiction.
In rem jurisdiction flows from a sovereign state’s authority over land and is engaged in disputes
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concerning land. In personam jurisdiction flows from a sovereign state’s authority over persons
and is engaged in disputes concerning persons.

4.1.2.1 Meaning of In Rem jurisdiction
In rem jurisdiction drives the choice of law for disputes about property and rights associated with
property. “The basic rule is that the power of courts to act directly upon immovables is limited to
those within the territory in which they sit”.213 Rights associated with immovables are treated the
same way as immovables. In Canada, all estates, interests, and charges are considered
immovables.214 Canadian courts, for example, will not make decisions about title to foreign
immovables,215 nor the right to possess, partition,216 nor make orders for the sale of foreign
immovables.217 The choice of law for immovable property is lex situs, i.e., the law of the
213
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jurisdiction in which the property is located, characterized as such by lex situs,218 with the
location of situs determined by lex fori, i.e., the law of the jurisdiction in which the court hearing
the dispute is located.219 Said another way, land and interests in land in a country are classified
by the laws of the country in which it is located.220 Consent of the parties or choice of law other
than lex situs for disputes concerning land or interests in land are not granted.221 Castel and
Walker write:222
As a general rule, all questions concerning rights over immovables are governed by the lex situs, namely
the law of the place where the immovable is situated because in the last resort land can only be dealt with in
a matter that the lex situs allows. This applies not only to immovable situated in any of the common law
provinces or territories but also immovable situated abroad, so far as Canadian courts have the jurisdiction
to deal with them.

The choice of law rule for land and interests in land being lex situs ensures countries’ exclusive
ability to determine the fates of land, land interests, and land uses within their territorial bounds.
The implication is that no other country’s judgments about how land is dealt with in another
country should carry the day.

4.1.2.2 Meaning of Jurisdiction Over Movable Property
Differences in the location of property and therefore choice of law arise depending on the legal
character of that property, or legal substance of relationships in respect of that property.223 For
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tangible movable property, the choice of law for the validity and effect of an assignment, or
choses in possession such as for tangible physical objects, is prima facie lex situs of the chose.224
For intangible movable property, such as choses in action such as debts, patents, copyright,
goodwill, stocks, and shares, the choice of law is the proper law of the debt or the chose.225
Notwithstanding the specific choice of law rules applicable to specific kinds of movable
property, the choice of law for movable property generally conforms to the principle that the
applicable law is that to which the event is most connected. In some contexts, movables are
governed by mobilia sequuntur personam, meaning that “movables follow the person” such that
the choice of law for the movable is the law of the domicile, residence or nationality of its
owner.226
4.1.2.3 Meaning of In Personam Jurisdiction
Regarding in personam jurisdiction, jurisdiction over a dispute concerning a person depends on
the community to which the person is most connected. In personam jurisdiction can be
conceptualized as domicile or residence, each with utility for different elements of a conflict of
laws analysis. In any event of the different ways of identifying personal law as either domicile or
residence, identifying personal law requires identifying connecting factors between the person
and the jurisdiction.227 In general, the applicable law will be the law of the place where the
person bears the most connections.
4.2

Governing Law Must Be Legitimately Chosen

While parties to a contract have wide autonomy to choose the law that governs their bargain,
their autonomy is not unlimited.228 In the Vita Food case, Lord Wright wrote of parties’
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expansive autonomy and its qualification, holding “it is difficult to see what qualifications are
possible [for parties’ autonomy in choice of law], provided the intention expressed is bona fide
and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public
policy”.229 The requirement that choices of law be bona fide generally requires choice of law
must not be used to evade the mandatory obligations of the law that would apply but for the
choice of law. The requirement that choice of law be legal means that the choice of law must not
violate the mandatory rules of the forum, i.e., the laws of the jurisdiction whose court is being
asked to uphold the choice of law clause and the entitlements it affords. The requirement that a
choice of law not be contrary to public policy demands that choice of law clauses not be used in
conspiracies or arrangements which seek to contravene the laws of another state with which the
contract bears connections.
4.2.1

Choice of Law Must be Bona Fide

If parties’ choice of law is not bona fide, the choice of law will be invalid for reasons of
“improper motive”.230 One circumstance where choice of law will be mala fide for “improper
motive”231 is “where the parties select the law of the country with which the contract has no
connection whatever” and without good reason for the choice.232 As the court wrote in Bank of
Montreal v Snoxell233 (“Snoxell”) “[t]he parties cannot make a pretence of contracting under one
law in order to validate an agreement that clearly has its closest connection with another law”. 234
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Courts determine whether or not a choice of law is bona fide with reference to the law of the
place to which the bargain bears the closest connections. Nexus acts like the barometer of first
resort for detecting a bona fide choice of law.
Despite the strong statement in Snoxell, mere absence of connection is not usually
enough, without more, to render a choice of law invalid for not being bona fide. Castel and
Walker note that in no cases has a party succeeded in having a choice of law clause in a contract
thrown out on the sole basis that the contract has no connection with the jurisdiction whose law
they chose.235 In all cases surveyed by Castel and Walker in their treatise, the courts found the
respective contracts’ connection with their chosen law to be sufficiently substantial to “qualify
the choice as bona fide”,236 amounting to a low bar of what constitutes connection. Choice of law
clauses are more likely to be found invalid if the unconnected law was chosen for a mala fide
reason.
Unconnected law will be invalid for being chosen for a mala fide reason in cases where
the selection is a “sham”. Where choice of law does not reflect the parties’ agreement it will be a
“sham choice” and rendered invalid.237 In 2106701 Ontario Inc (cob Novajet) v 2288450 Ontario
Ltd,238 the parties’ chose the law of Nova Scotia as the governing law for their contract. The
parties could offer no reason for their choice besides Nova Scotia law being in the template from
which the parties drafted their agreement. The court found the parties’ choice of law not bona
fide as it did not reflect their intentions.239
Unconnected law will also be invalid for not being bona fide where it was selected to
achieve an evasive purpose. Parties cannot make unconnected choices of law for the purpose of
evading mandatory obligations in the jurisdiction whose law would govern the bargain but for
the choice of law. The evasion principle240 provides that “parties cannot choose a law for the
235
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purpose of evading a mandatory rule of the law that objectively is most closely connected to their
contract.”241 In Canada, “mandatory rules” are “any statutory rules that, according to express or
implied terms of the legislation, bind the parties notwithstanding that their contract is otherwise
governed by the law of a foreign [country]”,242 i.e., “rules the parties cannot contract out of.”243
Fawcett describes “evasion” as “showing a preference for the application of one country's law
rather than that of another”, where such preference is shown “by going to another country in the
expectation that that country's law will be applied to their affairs”.244 The English treatise Dicey
and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, provides “[a]n evasive choice of law is unreal and
unreasonable and therefore without effect”.245
Similarly in the EU, the Rome I Regulation provides that parties may not, via choice of
law, contract out of obligations that would have been mandatory under the legal regimes that
would otherwise apply.246 See Article 3(3):
Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other
than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of
provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement.

In diverse legal contexts, choice of law other than the law to which a contract is connected must
not serve the purpose of evading, prejudicing, or otherwise circumventing the otherwise proper
law of the contract, being the law that bears the most connections to the bargain.
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4.2.2

Choice of Law Must be Legal

The “legality” requirement renders choice of law clauses invalid where a statute in the forum of
adjudication forbids them,247or alters the underlying contract law but for which the choice of law
would be otherwise valid.248 Canadian courts, for example, must apply the express and implied
rules and terms of statutes and legislation to which parties cannot contract out of and are subject
to in any event of the parties choice of law.249
Some statutes forbid particular choices of law such as those enacting international
agreements whereby states commit to require contracts of certain kinds contain certain uniform
rules that cannot be derogated from. 250 A statute which forbade particular choices of law
appeared in the Agro Co of Canada v “Regal Scout” case (Agro Co). 251. In Agro Co, the court
found the parties’ choice of law invalid because the choice of law had the ability to reduce the
carrier’s liability to less than what was required under the Hague Rules. A federal statute of the
forum court provided contracts could not include provisions which had the effect of reducing
carriers’ liability to less than what was provided in the Hague Rules.252 As a result, the choice of
law providing for less liability than statutorily mandated was found illegal.
Other statutes legislatively alter the underlying contract law to which choice of law
clauses must conform. For example, The UK’s Unfair Contract Act 1977253 alters the underlying
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English contract law by rendering invalid choice of law clauses that would otherwise carry the
day but which would result in unfair exclusion or limitation clauses. The Unfair Contract Act
1977 applies to foreclose unfair limitation or exclusion clauses even where parties have chosen
governing law different than UK law where “the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or arbiter
to have been imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to
evade the operation of this Act”.254 Another example altering the contract law for specific kinds
of bargains appears in the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act,255 subjecting bills of exchange to
particular choice of law rules other than that which would ordinarily apply at common law.256
Similarly, some Canadian provinces impose specific choice of law rules on contracts for
insurance.257
Choice of law clauses that elicit behaviour that is illegal in the jurisdiction of
performance will also fail the “legality” requirement. “Irrespective of its proper law, a contract
will not be enforced to the extent that performance of it would be illegal in the jurisdiction where
it was performed”.258 In the case of Zivnostenska Banka National Corp v Frankman, Lord Reid
wrote, “I think it is now settled law that, whatever the proper law of the contract, an English
court will not require a party to do an act in performance of a contract which would be an
offence under the law in force at the place where the act has to be done”.259
The Rome I Regulation provides similarly.260 The Rome I Regulation, Article 9 provides
that the mandatory rules of the jurisdiction where the contract is performed which would render
the performance of the contract unlawful may be considered in determining its enforceability,
operating through judicial discretion rather than imperative application:261
1. Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country
for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent
that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise
applicable to the contract under this Regulation.
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2. Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law
of the forum.
3. Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the
obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding
mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In considering whether to give
effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their
application or non-application.

In Canada and elsewhere, the “legality” requirement demands choice of law comply with statutes
and legislation in the relevant jurisdiction.
4.2.3

Choice of Law Must not be Contrary to Public Policy

In Canada, even if the parties have made a choice of law and their selection would be otherwise
valid, the contract as a whole will be invalid if it violates Canadian public policy. Determining a
violation of public policy does “not merely involve a definitional approach to the meaning of
public policy but requires a consideration of all the dimensions of the case which carry
implications for public policy”.262 The standard for finding a violation of public policy is high
and “turns on whether the foreign law is contrary to [a Canadian] view of basic morality”.263
“Making a contract that is part of a scheme to break the laws of another country has been
held to be against public policy”.264 Castel and Walker write:
A contract that can be formed legally, but which is in fact part of a plan to contravene the law of another
country, has been held to be unenforceable on the ground that to enforce it would be against international
comity and thus violate the public policy of the forum.265

The Canadian civil law adopts a similar response, but goes even further. Article 3079 of the
Quebec Civil Code266 gives courts discretion to reject choice of law clauses meant to circumvent
legal obligations in the jurisdiction to which “the situation is closely connected”. The Quebec
Civil Code provides:
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Where legitimate and manifestly preponderant interests so require, effect may be given to a mandatory
provision of the law of another country with which the situation is closely connected.
In deciding whether to do so, consideration is given to the purpose of the provision and the consequences of
its application.

In the historical European context, Article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention operated similarly to the
conflict of law anti-abuse rules, reading (emphasis added):
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of
the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law
of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering
whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the
consequences of their application or non-application.267

Similar once again, the Mexico Convention affords judicial discretion but nonetheless provides
“it shall be up to the forum to decide when it applies the mandatory provisions of the law of
another state with which the contract has close ties.”268
Choice of law clauses intended to act as intermediary regimes to achieve outcomes not
legal under the law to which the contract bears closest connection fail the “public policy”
requirement. In Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd269 (“Regazzoni”) public policy thwarted the
parties’ choice of law because the choice of law formed part of a conspiracy to break the laws of
another country. The contract concerned goods that had originated in India and were to be
delivered to a European port. The parties selected English law to govern the contract. The court
found it unenforceable upon ascertaining the parties’ intent to on-ship the goods to South Africa
under the pretense of English law an attempt to covertly violate an Indian law that imposed an
export prohibition not imposed by English law. In coming to its decision, the court applied
Foster v Driscoll270 (Foster). That case concerned the sale of whiskey at a Scottish port. The
court declined to enforce the contract upon finding that the parties’ intention was to smuggle the
whiskey into the USA in contravention of USA prohibition laws. The Ontario Court of Appeal
cited Foster in Shiesel v Kirsch,271 a case bearing substantial similarities, namely, that it also
involved plans to circumvent USA prohibition laws. 272
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4.3

The Conflict of Laws “Revenue Rule”

In the interest of maintaining state sovereignty over domestic public policy, COL/col does not
apply to all kinds of disputes. International taxation straddles public and private international
law, the latter of which COL/col is a part. Notwithstanding, the prevailing view in private
international law is that taxation is not private law, and so conflict of laws as a subset of private
international law does not apply to taxation. This prevailing view implicitly accepts a stark
division between ‘public’ and ‘private’ domestic law. Picking up on this stark division, in the
conflict of laws jurisprudence concerning taxation, Canada and other common law jurisdictions
adopt the common law ‘revenue rule’ and take the general position that foreign revenue laws, as
public laws, are not justiciable in Canadian courts.273 The revenue rule has long stood to support
the conclusion that taxation as the political instrument of revenue decidedly falls on the public
side of the stark divide, providing as the normative basis a deferential posture to states’ public
law, coupled with an understandable unwillingness of states to act as tax collector for a foreign
government unless expressly agreed in a treaty. The Rome I Regulation containing uniform rules
for choice of law in contract for European member states who sign on, contains a similar rule
that the Rome I Regulation “shall not apply … to revenue, customs or administrative matters”.274
Private international law scholars understand tax law as sitting decidedly outside the realm of
domestic private law, and therefore decidedly outside the realm of private international law
dispute resolution mechanisms, including conflict of laws.
Tax treaties allocate tax revenue and administrative burden between treaty countries with
simultaneous legitimate taxing power. Allocative functions do not alone constitute an agreement
to enforce, collect, or remit tax for the benefit of the treaty partner as would be foreclosed by the
revenue rule.275 Some treaties provide for assistance in collection of tax, suggesting that
allocative functions alone are not enough to amount to an agreement to enforce, collect, or remit
tax for the benefit of the treaty partner. Interpreting tax treaties’ allocative provisions is not
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synonymous with enforcing foreign revenue laws, so the revenue rule does not apply to foreclose
conflict of laws principles as an interpretive aid or implicit thread in the treaty context.
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5

Distributive Rules Using “Choice of Law” to Find Governing Law

Express choice of law clauses to select one governing law are essential if countries as parties in
contracts want to have autonomy over the legal context which animates and informs their rights,
and even have a contract at all. Before the treaty can operate to allocate taxing rights between the
contracting states, the contracting states must ascertain the law that applies to give meaning to
the specific provisions of their bargain. Without knowing the governing law of the specific
provisions of their bargain, it is impossible to determine exactly what arrangement created and
how it will operate. It is therefore not surprising that certain of the OECD 2017 Model Tax
Treaty’s distributive rules contain implicit income-by-income governing law provisions. 276
These choice of law distributive rules expressly provides which one of the contracting states’
respective laws should apply to determine the meaning and therefore treatment of various
income types. The presence of governing law features in these clauses of the OECD 2017 Model
Tax Treaty simultaneously acknowledges that conflicts of tax law result from an underlying
conflict of private laws problem and seeks to solve it by allowing parties to ascertain the
governing law.

5.1

Tax Treaties Ascertaining a Single Governing Law

The OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty goes to the trouble expressly providing whose law should
apply in a template treaty designed for general use by a wide variety of countries. The fact that
one law must be chosen no matter the treaty partners engaged in the bargain implies there is
more than one law to choose from and that before the choice of one is made, two or more
conceivably apply and that a choice of one is necessary for the treaty to function.277 Examples
include rules for foreign tax recognition, dividends, and interest.
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5.1.1

Foreign Tax Recognition Rules

Article 23A and 23B is a specific example of the imperative nature of governing law. As
discussed above, Articles 23A and 23B contain foreign tax recognition rules that set out when
contracting states extend credits or exemptions in the event of a qualification or classification
conflict regarding how the treaty’s terms should apply. Implicitly, Articles 23A and 23B of the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty endeavour to facilitate reconciliation by pointing either to selfand internally-executing choice of law rules (for qualification conflicts) or Mutual Agreement
Procedure (for classification conflicts) whereby competent authorities engage in negotiations to
devise bespoke governing law to apply in the particular circumstance. This in and of itself
acknowledges the COL/col foundation that there is more than one legal meaning of a term at
play and that in order for the bargain to effectively operate, the contracting states must identify a
governing law for the dispute in question, whether through self-executing rules or bespoke law.
5.1.2

Dividends

Another example of express choice of law language in the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty
distributive rules is found in Article 10. The inclusion of explicit choice of law wording in the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty in Article 10 represents an implicit acknowledgement that more
than one legal system may apply to characterize the event, and that in order for the tax treaty to
effectively operate in respect of that article, a single governing law must be indicated.
Article 10 deals with dividends. Article 10(1) provides that “[d]ividends paid by a
company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State
may be taxed in that other State” but as per Article 10(2), withholding taxes may be set as
negotiated by competent authorities for beneficial owners of the dividends. The term “dividends”
is partially defined in Article 10 as the “income from shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance”
rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in
profits, as well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation
treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the company making the
distribution is a resident” (emphasis added). The OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty contemplates
treating “other corporate rights” as dividends if they are treated the same as dividends in the
country from which payment pursuant to the other corporate right is paid, i.e., the law of the
country with the prospective withholding tax claim. The fact that a choice of law for the meaning
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of the term “dividend” is provided implies that other jurisdiction’s legal systems could apply to
derive the definition, but expressly opts for the other to apply. Article 10 acknowledges and preempts a conflict of tax law issue by selecting a governing law for this article of the contracting
states’ bargain.
Without the express choice of law wording in Article 10, it would be unclear what the
contracting states meant by “income from other corporate rights”. Article 10 clears up the
uncertainty by pointing to “the laws of the State of which the company making the distribution is
a resident” to determine what other corporate rights are included in the meaning of “dividend”
for the purposes of operation of Article 10. Without indication of the governing law for Article
10, the provision would be a “mere abstraction” just like contracts without a governing law as
per the conflict of laws case, Star Texas.278 In including a choice of law clause to select the
governing law, Article 10 appears aware of this.
5.1.3

Interest

The interest articles in Canada’s tax treaties with the USA and UK demonstrate how countries as
parties indicate a choice of law. Article 11 of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty concerns
interest. Article 11(1) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty provides “[i]nterest arising in a
Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other
State,” but as per Article 11(2), withholding taxes are set at 10% or a figure by negotiation of
competent authorities on the interest payment for beneficial owners of the interest. The term
“interest” is fully defined in OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty’s Article 11(3). However, in
Canada’s tax treaties with the USA, the treatment extends to “income assimilated into income
from money lent by the taxation laws of the Contracting State in which the income arises”.279 A
legal determination is required, and therefore, a recourse to domestic law of one of the
contracting states as governing law. Canada and the USA chose “the taxation laws of the
Contracting State in which the income arises” and act as governing law. 280 Canada and the UK
similarly selected a governing law for the interest article in their treaty to the extent that “income
assimilated to income from money lent” is determined according to “the taxation law of the State
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in which the income arises”.281 Meaning of the treaty terms relies on its governing law because
the governing law described what kinds of e.g., income, belongs to an income category, as is
essential to allocate tax share between treaty states, as is the treaties’ function.
The express choice of law wording in Article 10 and Article 11 in the Canada-USA and
Canada-UK treaty context acknowledges the concurrent contending claims of two or more legal
systems but for a method of choosing one law to govern, and latently employs COL/col
principles in order to do so.

5.2

Tax Treaties Ascertaining Governing Law With Most Connections to Event

Article 3(2)282 of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty also endeavours to ascertain one governing
law bearing the closest connections to the event implicitly employing COL/col principles. In the
absence of explicit choice of law wording the applicable OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty article,
Article 3(2) steps in as the analog to an overarching, general choice of law clause. Article 3(2)
provides undefined terms are to be determined according to the tax law283 of the country whose
tax claim it is, and if the term does not exist in the tax law, at domestic private law of that
country.284
Article 3(2) allows contracting states to ascertain the governing law for treaty provisions
turning on undefined terms by imploring those undefined terms take the meaning they have at
domestic tax law, which is an accessory to domestic private law, lodged within a greater
281
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domestic legal system which characterizes persons, relationships, entities, etc. Because Article
3(2) directs undefined terms in the treaty be interpreted according to the domestic law of the
country whose tax is in issue, Article 3(2) implicitly points to the domestic law most closely
connected to the tax dispute to which the tax law is accessory to act as the governing law.
5.2.1

‘Beneficial Ownership’ Cases

The mechanism of Article 3(2) for the harmonious intersection of multiple legal regimes
contending to apply is apparent in cases on ‘beneficial ownership’. The term ‘beneficial
ownership’ appears frequently in tax treaties but is not defined. The paucity of definition is
significant because a company’s status as beneficial owner as opposed to a conduit is the basis
on which some treaty benefits flow, e.g., withholding tax in respect of interest, royalties, and
dividends. Beneficial ownership cases show how the power to define an undefined term goes to
the country whose tax claim is in issue, and is therefore jurisdiction the most connected with the
tax dispute. The cases of Prevost Car Inc v The Queen285 (“Prevost Car”), Indofood
International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA286 (“Indofood”), and Ministre de
L’Economi, des Finances et de L’Indistrie v Societe Bank of Scotland287 (“Bank of Scotland”) all
resulted in judicial decisions intrinsically informed by the COL/col principles of closest
connection.
Prevost Car employed Canadian law for a Canadian withholding tax claim. In Prevost
Car, Canadian civil and common law meanings in corporate law were used to determine a
Canadian withholding tax claim. A Netherlands company was interposed between Canadian,
Swedish, and UK companies to facilitate the payment of dividends from the Canadian company
to the Swedish and UK companies at a lower withholding tax rate. At the time, the CanadaNetherlands treaty provided 5% withholding tax, compared the 10% and 15% under the CanadaUK and Canada-Sweden treaty.
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Justice Rip acknowledged that “beneficial owner” is undefined in the tax treaty and the
ITA. He determined that pursuant to Article 3(2) the term was to take the meaning it had at
Canadian domestic private law. He considered the Canadian common law, income tax law, and
the Civil Code of Quebec,288 and Dutch law aided by expert testimony. He said “Article 3(2) of
the Tax Treaty requires me to look to a domestic solution in interpreting ‘beneficial owner’”289.
He declined to devise an internationally consistent definition of the term.290
Justice Rip held the company interposed between the Canadian, Swedish, and UK entities
was a beneficial owner based on the common law and civil law meanings of the term.291 He
noted that common law and civil law recognize that “the persons who ultimately receive the
income are the owners of the income property”,292 as opposed to conduits which could not be
beneficial owners. Establishing Holdco was not a conduit, the door remained open for it to be a
beneficial owner. “Beneficial owner” being undefined in respect of a Canadian tax claim, and
Canadian law applied to determine the meaning of the treaty term. The effect was that the law
that applied to bring meaning to the bargain was the law of the place to which the tax dispute
was most connected, i.e., the country whose tax claim it was.
Indofood is another example of recourse to the domestic law of the country whose tax is
in issue absent bespoke choice of law for the income type by the parties’ countries. Indofood
concerned the application of Indonesian law for Indonesian withholding tax claim. The issue
was whether (hypothetical) interest channeled through a (hypothetical) Netherlands company
(hypothetically) interposed to gain benefits under Indonesia-Netherlands treaty was valid.
Indofood was a contract case. The plaintiff was obligated by loan note terms to mitigate tax risk
as a precondition to redemption. The defendant argued the plaintiff’s failure to insert a company
to gain benefit under the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty amounted to a failure to mitigate tax
risk and liability, was therefore in breach of its obligations, and thus no redemption was
permitted. The court had to determine whether the plaintiff could have mitigated the tax risk by
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inserting a Netherlands company to gain benefit under the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty such
that failure to do so rendered it in breach of the loan note terms.
The English Court of Appeal consulted information circulars from Indonesia, being the
treaty country whose tax claim was hypothetically in issue, to overturn the English High Court’s
decision that the hypothetical Newco could have been a beneficial owner.293 The Court of
Appeal held that the Newco could not be a beneficial owner, citing passages of the relevant
OECD commentary and the information circular produced by the Indonesian tax authorities.
Reliance on the Indonesian information circular amounts to an indirect and implicit reliance on
Indonesian law to determine the meaning of beneficial owner, i.e., the law of the jurisdiction
whose tax claim was hypothetically in issue.
Even though the case concerned an English contract and was heard in the English courts,
the court considered the information circulars containing the law of the jurisdiction whose tax
was in issue because the dispute concerned a hypothetical Indonesian tax claim. Consulting
Indonesian law implicitly acknowledges Article 3(2)’s direction to the law of the jurisdiction
with the closest connection to the tax dispute, i.e., the law of the jurisdiction whose tax claim
(even if hypothetical) was in issue, to determine what the transaction was and what the
significance of the transaction was.
Bank of Scotland concerned application of French law for a French dividend tax credit
claim. A UK company was interposed between a USA company and its French subsidiary. The
structure endeavoured to provide access to the dividend tax credit in the France-UK treaty. Such
provision was absent from the France-USA treaty. The French Supreme Administrative Court
(Conseil d’Etat) overturned the lower court decision, finding the UK bank was not the beneficial
owner but a mere conduit interposed between the USA and French companies to access the
dividend tax credit.
In overturning the lower court decision, the Conseil d’Etat re-characterized the dividends
as interest. Showing attention to the question of ‘what is the nature of the transaction, person,
income, etc.?’ and an implicit prioritizing of legal systems, the court viewed the case as a
secured lending case, with shareholding acting as security for another financial transaction for
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The Court of Appeal also cited commentary of Phillip Baker, who on the other hand, advocates an
internationally-consistent fiscal definition not derived treaty parties’ domestic laws, at Indofood, supra note 286 at
paras 24, 34.

67

which interest, not dividends, were paid. In so doing, the court looked through the transaction
and found the USA company remained the beneficial owner.
There is no legal concept nor legal meaning of beneficial ownership in French civil law.
In France, treaty shopping through e.g., conduits, is abusive. The Conseil d’Etat’s approach is
consistent with France’s “abuse of rights” doctrine commonly employed to resist treaty abuse.294
The doctrine allowed the court to look beneath the transaction to glean economic substance. The
re-characterization amounts to the Conseil d’Etat applying French domestic law because recharacterizing the dividends as interest facilitated the look-through characteristic of the French
abuse of rights doctrine. The court found the USA corporation remained the beneficial owner of
the dividends, deciding the “beneficial ownership” issue from the perspective of treaty abuse
available through application of its own domestic legal tools. In Bank of Scotland, French law
was employed to determine the legitimacy of the French dividend tax credit claim.
Beneficial ownership cases show how Article 3(2) drives countries to ascertain governing
law as the law of the place which has the closest connections to the tax dispute, i.e., the law of
jurisdiction whose treaty the taxpayer seeks to access benefits under. In this, Article 3(2) thus
directs determination of the facts, both legal and factual, toward the legal system with the closest
connection.
5.3

Tax Treaties Ascertaining Governing Law Dependent on Character of Event

Some of the choice of law distributive rules contemplate and distribute of taxing rights between
contracting states on the grounds of which legal system has the closest connection to the income
along the lines of whether the income is fundamentally connected to land or to a person
resembling COL/col concepts of in rem or in personam choice of law and adjudicative
jurisdiction. The conflict of laws notions of in rem and in personam bear striking similarity to the
source/residence paradigm in taxation. Countries wield tax claims over income from a source by
virtue of the income’s primary connection to the territory under the control of the country
wielding the tax claim. Countries wield tax claims on the basis of residence by virtue of the
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income’s primary connection to a person subject to the authority of the country wielding the tax
claim.295
5.3.1

Governing Law on In Rem Basis

The OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty implicitly appreciates a country’s exclusive right to
determine rights and obligations in respect of land or land rights located within its jurisdiction by
indicating choice of law is the country of source. Articles 6 and 13 contain express choice of law
wording indicating choice of law for land and land rights as the country of source, in keeping
with the COL/col in rem principle that choice of law for immovables is the law of the place
where the land is located.
5.3.1.1 Immovable Property
Article 6(2) of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty provides that “[t]he term “immovable
property” shall have the meaning which it has under the law of the Contracting State in which
the property in question is situated” (emphasis added). Articles 6(2) (emphasis added) and 6(3)
respectively elucidate the meaning of “immovable property” such that “[t]he term shall in any
case include property accessory to immovable property, livestock and equipment used in
agriculture and forestry, rights to which the provisions of general law respecting landed property
apply, usufruct of immovable property and rights to variable or fixed payments as consideration
for the working of, or the right to work, mineral deposits, sources and other natural resources;
ships and aircraft shall not be regarded as immovable property” and “[t]he provisions of
paragraph 1 shall apply to income derived from the direct use, letting, or use in any other form of
immovable property”. In this, choice of law for the meaning of immovable property and the
rights associated with the land and fixtures associated with the same are determined according to
the law of the place where the immovable is situated, like the COL/col in rem jurisdiction
concept.
5.3.1.2 Alienations of Immovables and Capital Gains
Article 13 of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty employs an indirect choice of law along in rem
lines by incorporating domestic law via Article 3(2). Because Article 3(2) provides that any
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undefined terms in the treaty be ascertained according to the law of the jurisdiction whose tax
claim it is, to the extent of ambiguity in the definition of immovable property in the OECD 2017
Model Tax Treaty, Article 3(2) indirectly provides choice of law on an in rem basis for Articles
13(1) and 13(4).
Article 13 concerns capital gains and operates to ensure that alienations of capital
property are taxed in the jurisdiction where they are most connected. While Article 13 does not
contain and explicit choice of law paragraph, it is implicit in its acknowledgement and support of
a contracting state’s tax claim on an in rem basis. Article 13(1) and (4) are explicit that a
contracting state has a tax claim to gains derived from dispositions of land, rights to land, and
fixtures in its territory. Article 13(1) provides that “[g]ains derived by a resident of a Contracting
State from the alienation of immovable property referred to in Article 6 and situated in the other
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.” Article 13(4) expands the meaning of
immovable property rights further to include shares that derive more than 50% of their value
from immovable property: “[g]ains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the
alienation of shares or comparable interests, such as interests in a partnership or trust, may be
taxed in the other Contracting State if, at any time during the 365 days preceding the alienation,
these shares or comparable interests derived more than 50 per cent of their value directly or
indirectly from immovable property, as defined in Article 6, situated in that other State”.
The effect of Article 13(1) and (4) is that gains on the disposition of immovable property,
which includes land, rights to land, and fixtures per the definition in Article 6, may be taxed in
the jurisdiction where the land, rights to land, and fixtures are located. Given that Article 13(1)
renders the tax claim to be that of the jurisdiction where the land, rights to land, and fixtures are
located, and given Article 3(2) providing that any undefined terms in respect of the definition of
immovable property or related rights will be determined according to the law of the contracting
state who maintains a tax claim, the implicit choice of law is that of the jurisdiction where the
land, rights to land, and fixtures are located. In this, the combined effect of Articles 13(1), 13(4)
and 3(2) is the choice of law for undefined terms in respect of gains derived from disposition of
immovable property is the jurisdiction where the land is located, i.e., the contracting state that
would otherwise wield in rem jurisdiction.
By directly (in Article 6) or indirectly (in Articles 13(1) and (4)) providing that the
governing law to derive the meaning of “immovable property” is to be determined by the laws of
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the jurisdiction where the property is located, the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty adopts an
approach consistent with the COL/col principle that issues concerning land and rights associated
with land be determined only according the law of the place where they are located. While
choice of law rules differ between jurisdictions, countries’ respect for the principle that the lands
of a jurisdiction be governed by its laws enjoys wide consensus.296 Sovereign jurisdictions have
law-making power over the lands in their territory, and no one else’s laws ought apply to them,
including indirectly in and through the tax treaty context.
The OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty’s direction on which country’s law should get to
prescribe the meaning of “immovable property” acknowledges instances of tax system encounter
as a choice of law problem, i.e., whose law determines what is meant by “immovable property”,
and proposes resolution for the problem directing that the governing law is the legal system with
the closest connections on in rem lines, i.e., the legal system where the immovable property is
located.
5.3.2

Governing Law on Movable Basis

The OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty’s treatment of movable property similarly follows a COL/col
approach. The combined operation of Article 13(5) and Article 3(2) illustrates of the OECD
2017 Model Tax Treaty’s implicit appreciation of COL/col regarding movable property.
5.3.2.1.1 Dispositions of Movable Property
Article 13(5) deals with gains flowing from the disposition property other than immovable
property. Article 13(5) is explicit that “[g]ains from the alienation of any property, other than
that referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of
which the alienator is a resident”. Consistent with the choice of law principles that the choice of
law for disputes concerning movable property is the law of the jurisdiction where the movable
property is most connected, the wide conception of Article 13(5) affords the tax right to the gains
296
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from disposition of movable property to the “Contracting State of which the alienator is a
resident.” As movable, the property is not necessarily most connected to the territory in which it
is located and may be most connected to the person who holds it. In allocating taxing rights in
respect of movable property to the jurisdiction where the alienator is resident, any undefined
terms in respect of the alienation of movable property are to be determined according to the law
of the place where the alienator, analogous to the movable property rights holder, is located. This
is consistent with the COL/col approach that the choice of law for disputes concerning movable
property be the law of the jurisdiction where the event is most connected.
5.3.3

Governing Law on In Personam Basis

A country’s entitlement to residence-based taxation bears a striking similarity to in personam
jurisdiction. Like jurisdiction over disputes concerning persons domiciled or resident in a
jurisdiction, the right of a country to tax based on residence shifts depending on where the person
establishes connections. Tax residents and COL/col residents or those domiciled in a jurisdiction
both hold as part of their legal personality the capacity to move, to root, and to uproot. When
they move and establish connections in a place, they come under the jurisdiction of the law of the
place in which they are located, whether that jurisdiction is the tax jurisdiction of a country to tax
the tax resident’s income, or the COL/col jurisdiction of a country to extend its law to a dispute
concerning the person.
5.3.3.1 Employment Income and Benefits
Articles 15 and 18 how a person’s connection to a jurisdiction via employment may drive the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty’s allocation of choice of law. Article 15 concerns income from
employment. Article 15(1) provides “salaries, wages and other similar remuneration derived by a
resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in that State
unless the employment is exercised in the other Contracting State” but that “[i]f the employment
is so exercised, such remuneration as is derived therefrom may be taxed in that other State.”
Article 15(2) describes the conditions for when the contracting state of residence has a taxing
right to the employment income even though the employee performed the employment activities
somewhere else. The conditions in Article 15(2) suggest that the contracting state of residence
may only lay a claim to tax employment income earned in the contracting state of source if the
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employee’s remuneration for employment was not paid at a permanent establishment in the
source country297 or if the employee was not employed by a resident of the contracting state of
source.298 Article 18 follows a similar progression, providing that “pensions and other similar
remuneration paid to a resident of a Contracting State in consideration of past employment shall
be taxable only in that State”. The effect of Articles 15 and 18 is that the contracting state with
the strongest connection to the employment relationship and employment activities maintains the
right to tax the employee’s income, with permanent establishment and employer residence acting
as substantial factors. To the extent that there are undefined terms in the tax treaty in respect of
that state’s entitlement to tax employment income, Article 3(2) operates so that those undefined
terms are determined according to the law of the contracting state of closest connection to the
employment relationship and employment activities, effectively assigning governing law to the
state with the closest connection consistent with choice of law principles.
While employment contracts are not necessarily claims in personam, the notion that the
implicit choice of law for undefined terms in respect tax claims concerning employment income
is the jurisdiction with the closest connection to the person and the person’s employment activity
and relationship is consistent with choice of law notions that absent a choice of law for an
employment contract, the governing law or “proper law” is the law of the place where the
employee mainly performs his or her duties,299 or in “cases in which the proper law was held not
to be that of the country where the employee was working, were generally ones where the
employee and the employer were both from one country and the posting to another country was
one of limited duration or for a particular project”.300 In this, Articles 15 and 18 of the OECD
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2017 Model Tax Treaty show implicit appreciation of the COL/col principle that the governing
law for employment matters is the law of the place with the closest ties to the employment
relationship and activities.
5.4

Concluding on Distributive Rules

These distributive articles illustrate the different ways the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty
acknowledges a conflict of tax laws and locates governing law as the legal system with the
closest connections according to COL/col principles. Just as COL/col does, each choice of law
distributive rule discussed endeavours to ascertain a single, most closely connected governing
law. The presence of governing law features in the distributive articles of the OCED 2017 Model
Tax Treaty simultaneously acknowledge an underlying conflict of laws problem and seek to
solve it by ascertaining a governing law to characterize the subject of the dispute based on which
contending legal system it has the closest connections to.

(Applicable law was Ontario law for Ontario resident contract-hire by Ontario company for work on project in
Venezuela).

74

6

Anti-Abuse Rules Using “Choice of Law” to Find Governing Law

The implicit incorporation of COL/col principles also appear in the “minimum” standards to
prevent “treaty shopping” and treaty abuse described in the OECD’s Action 6 Report301 (“OECD
2015 Action 6 Report”) and reflected in the Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures To Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting302 (“MLI”), the 2017 revisions to
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and although pre-dating the OECD 2015 Action 6 Report, the
Canada-USA Tax Treaty post-Fifth Protocol.
COL/col anti-abuse principles have, whether deliberately or not, found their way into the
foundations of the anti-treaty shopping provisions in the MLI and OECD 2017 Model Tax
Treaty. This is because at its core “treaty shopping” expresses the OECD’s frustration with
improper express choices of private law, tax law, treaty law, and treaty benefits by corporate
taxpayers. Conduit companies provide an illustrative example of treaty shopping as a COL/col
problem.303
Consider an arrangement where a Canadian company must pay royalties to a company
resident in Netherlands Antilles. Canada does not have a tax treaty with Netherlands Antilles,
and so royalties paid by the Canadian company to the Netherlands Antilles company attract 25%
withholding tax. In response, the Netherlands Antilles company incorporates a subsidiary in the
Netherlands, the latter country with which Canada does have a tax treaty calling for a lesser 10%
withholding tax, and assigns the newly-created Netherlands subsidiary its rights to receive the
royalties. The newly-created Netherlands subsidiary is subject to the private laws of the
Netherlands, the Netherlands tax laws as accessory to the Netherlands private law, and more
specifically the Netherlands tax treaty law and related benefits it receives by being subject to
Netherlands tax law as a resident, including the 10% withholding tax rate. The subsidiary uses its
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access to the treaty benefits to access preferential tax treatment for others in the corporate group
by acting as an intermediary in its transactions.
The act of creating an entity under the corporate law of a country enables the selection of
the accessory tax law that will apply to that entity. Tax law being an accessory to private law,
selection of private law implies an indirect selection of tax law, tax treaty law, and tax treaty
benefits that flow from being a subject of the private law of a state. In arrangements like that in
Velcro described above, the corporate group attempted to indirectly select the private law, tax
law, treaty law, and treaty benefits that flow from being subject to the same for one of its
newborn members. This is because as a resident, the newly created subsidiary is subject to the
domestic corporate law, accessory tax law, and subset tax treaty law in the jurisdiction of its
birth. This example shows an attempt to leverage an indirect choice of private law, tax law, and
treaty law to realize the tax savings benefits of that choice of law and pass them onto other
corporate group members through the newborn subsidiary serving as intermediary in crossborder transactions.
When a corporate taxpayer successfully engages in treaty shopping, it has effectively
selected the private law, tax law, treaty law, and effective tax rates under the treaty. There is little
difference between a company drafting a contract with a choice of law clause to provide that the
contract is to be governed by the corporate laws of a country, and the same company
incorporating a subsidiary in a jurisdiction such that the laws of that desired jurisdiction naturally
apply in an intermediary fashion. The former is a direct choice of law. The latter is an indirect
choice of law. Regardless of whether direct or indirect, the fact is that a choice of law is taking
place.
Implicitly reflecting this dynamic, anti-treaty shopping provisions in the MLI and the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty employ the COL/col anti-abuse approach, foreclosing parties’
selection of law to govern a contract if such selection is not bona fide, not illegal, and is contrary
to public policy.
The MLI, OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and Canada-USA Tax Treaty (collectively,
“the treaties”) reflect the COL/col anti-abuse approach “bona fide” requirement because the
treaties provide that if there is no proper basis in the taxpayer’s nexus for selecting the chosen
tax law, and the reason for choosing the selected law is evasive, as determined through legal
tests, treaty benefits are denied. Articles 6 (preamble) and 7 (principal purpose test (“PPT”) and
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limitation on benefits (“LOB”) anti-abuse rules) of the MLI and their equivalents in the OECD
2017 Model Tax Treaty set out indicia of connection and evasion reminiscent of COL/col antiabuse “bona fide” requirement. Nexus acts as a sort of baseline through which to determine if a
choice of a law is prima facie bona fide. If there is an identifiable nexus between the taxpayer
and the legal regime, the treaty acknowledges that treaty shopping or treaty abuse is unlikely to
be afoot. If there is no identifiable nexus between the taxpayer and the legal regime, the treaty
tests for evasive conduct and if found, denies the choice of private law, tax law, treaty law, and
treaty benefits on that basis. Accessing treaty benefits via another legal regime rather than the
one that properly applies, i.e., treaty rates versus non-treaty rates, to the taxpayer is evasive of
the laws the contracting state intends to impose on the treaty shopper.
The MLI, OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and Canada-USA Tax Treaty reflect the
COL/col anti-abuse approach “legality” requirement because the treaties deny treaty benefits to
taxpayers whose selection of the chosen tax regime is not lawful in the forum where the taxpayer
seeks to have its entitlement acknowledged, i.e., explicitly through domestic anti-avoidance rules
and doctrines which the OECD and contracting states expressly acknowledge operate in tandem
with the MLI, OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and Canada-USA Tax Treaty, or through treatybased anti-avoidance rules and doctrines imposing very similar standards to domestic antiavoidance rules and doctrines such that violation of the treaty-based rules imply a violation of
domestic rules.
The MLI, OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and Canada-USA Tax Treaty also implicitly
reflect the COL/col anti-abuse approach “public policy” requirement. Considering that income
shall generally only be taxed once,304 “treaty shopping” behaviour implies the taxpayer is
deliberately stepping outside of the laws that would otherwise apply due to genuine nexus but for
the “treaty shopping” behaviour to access another regime, the latter applying to the exclusion of
the former. COL/col principles provide that but for a legitimate express or implied choice of law,
the proper law to govern an arrangement is the law of the place to which the arrangement bears
the most connections.305 Stepping outside of the laws that would apply but for “treaty shopping”
behaviour as a choice of law is a latent contravention of the “proper”, most closely connected

304

League of Nations, Single Tax Principle Report, supra note 22 detailing the League of Nations “single tax
principle” still reflected in modern tax treaties.
305
Walker and Castel, Conflict of Laws, supra note 187, §31.3(c)(i) “The Closest and Most Real Connection Test”.

77

law by subjugating and subverting it in ways it was not intended to bend, in violation of its
mandatory laws, including tax law and negotiated tax treaties forming part thereof.
Arrangements which break the express and implied mandatory statutory rules of another state
violate public policy, including by using chosen legal regimes as intermediaries to access
benefits not afforded under the otherwise applicable “proper”, most closely connected law. In
Canada and elsewhere, it is a mandatory rule to submit to the tax authorities of one’s country.
Accessing benefits that one’s law expressly does not provide, i.e., because the treaty does not
contain it, is an implicit violation of what one’s law does contain, because the taxpayer is
stepping outside of what the law to which it is subject does contain to access something else
beyond its bounds. In this, under the COL/col conception, “treaty shopping” choices of law form
part of an arrangement to contravene the tax law and treaty law of another state rendering the
choice invalid for reasons of public policy.
The MLI, OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and Canada-USA Tax Treaty contain antitreaty shopping provisions that endeavour to ensure corporate taxpayers are not able to choose
the private law, tax law, and therefore applicable tax treaties and benefits, that apply to their
transaction unless their doing so is, to use COL/col terms, bona fide, legal, and not contrary to
public policy.
6.1

Preamble Revised to Reflect Anti-Treaty Shopping Purpose

The OECD 2015 Action 6 Report provides tax treaties should contain a “clear statement” that
“the Contracting States, when entering into a treaty, wish to prevent tax avoidance and, in
particular, intend to avoid creating opportunities for treaty shopping”.306 This recommendation
sparked changes to the preamble of existing bilateral tax treaties through the MLI’s Article 6,
and the preamble of OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty on a go-forward basis. Revisions to the
preamble are significant in part because they are “relevant to the interpretation and application of
the provisions”.307
The preamble of the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty provides:
Desiring to further develop their economic relationship and to enhance their co-operation in tax matters,
306

OECD 2015 Action 6 Report, supra note 301 at para 19; See David G Duff, “Tax Treaty Abuse and the Principal
Purpose Test – Part 2” (2018) 66:4 Can Tax J 947 [Duff, “PPT Part 2”] at 950-955.
307
OECD 2015 Action 6 Report, ibid at para 73.

78

Intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income
and on capital without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this
Convention for the indirect benefit of residents of third States)…

Duff compares the text of preambles in pre-OECD 2015 Action 6 Report tax treaties to the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty’s preamble reflecting the OECD 2015 Action 6 Report
changes.308 The former describes the purpose of the tax treaty as being to address “the avoidance
of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on
capital,” whereas the latter makes a definitive specification, noting that contracting states intend
their convention to advance “the elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income
and on capital without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax
evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs
provided in this Convention for the indirect benefit of residents of third States)”.309 The
commentary to the 2017 OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty reflecting these revisions is explicit
about the purpose of the definitive specification:310
The changes made expressly recognise that the purposes of the Convention are not limited to the
elimination of double taxation and that the Contracting States do not intend the provisions of the
Convention to create opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion and avoidance.
Given the particular base erosion and profit shifting concerns arising from treaty-shopping arrangements, it
was also decided to refer explicitly to such arrangements as one example of tax avoidance that should not
result from tax treaties, it being understood that this was only one example of tax avoidance that the
Contracting States intend to prevent.

Article 6 of the MLI provides that “Covered Tax Agreement[s] shall be modified to include the
following preamble text:”311
Intending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes covered by this agreement without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through
treaty shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect benefit
of residents of third jurisdictions.)312
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Parties may only reserve the right to omit this exact text from their covered tax agreements if
their tax treaty preambles already contain language “describing the intent of the contracting
jurisdictions to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or
reduced taxation, whether that language is limited to cases of tax evasion or avoidance (including
treaty shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining relief provided in the covered tax agreements
for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions) or applies more broadly”.313 In this,
post-MLI preambles must contemplate and express intention to foreclose, at a minimum, treaty
shopping and resultant extension of benefits for third-country residents. Considering the effect of
contracting states’ recent and ascertainable intention as demonstrated through revised treaty
terms on interpretation of the treaty and its provisions, i.e., recent statements of intent
ascertainable in commentaries and contemporaneous agreement being most probative,314 the
MLI’s requirement that countries adopt Article 6(1)’s exact text “in place of or in the absence of
preamble language”315 demonstrates the MLI’s attempt have the contracting states make clear
their intention that their treaties endeavor to reduce and shall be interpreted to foreclose double
non-taxation while ensuring that opportunities for non-taxation or insufficient taxation are not
created, with treaty shopping at top of mind.316

6.2

Preambles Reflecting “Choice of Law” Anti-Abuse Approach

Striking parallels exist between the revised preambles in the MLI and OECD 2017 Model Tax
Treaty and the COL/col anti-abuse approach. Both are intolerant of direct or indirect choices of
law that are not bona fide, not legal and are contrary to public policy.
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6.2.1

Preambles Showing “Bona Fide” Requirement

The preambles implicitly incorporate the COL/col bona fide requirement. Where there is no
nexus between taxpayers, income, and the treaty, the preamble is sensitive to evasive purposes
that may drive taxpayers to select a tax and treaty law with which they have no nexus, and denies
the choice of law in such circumstances.
The preambles are explicit that treaty benefits do not extend to “residents of third states”,
as impliedly contrasted with residents of contracting states, implying that treaty benefits ought
only to flow to those connected to either of the contracting states. Castel and Walker note that
parties’ choice of law will not be bona fide “where the parties select the law of the country with
which the contract has no connection whatever” and without good reason for the choice.317
Similar to the COL/col anti-abuse approach, the preambles’ notion of nexus suggests that parties’
choice of law should be in some way connected to the chosen law, less suspicions be raised and
further inquiry into mala fide purpose behind the choice of law be required.
As the interpretive compass for the treaty, the preambles suggest that the subsequent
treaty provisions be read with a mind to foreclosing “evasion or avoidance (including through
treaty shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in [the tax treaty]”318 by
individuals who bear no nexus to the contracting states’ legal systems. Similarly, COL/col cases
and scholarship suggest “that parties cannot choose a law for the purpose of evading a mandatory
rule of the law that objectively is most closely connected to their contract”.319 The case of
Kiener, discussed above, is an example of the English court refusing arguments which would
allow parties to contract out of international tax obligations such as withholding tax, suggesting
income tax laws as “mandatory rules”.320 In Canada, “mandatory” income tax rules include the
general anti-avoidance rule, which defines “tax benefit” to include “an increase in a refund of tax
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or other amount under this Act as a result of a tax treaty”.321 “Treaty shopping” to circumvent
mandatory laws that would otherwise apply fits the COL/col definition of evasion proposed by
Fawcett, “where laws are evaded by persons showing a preference for the application of one
country's law rather than that of another”, where such preference is shown “by going to another
country in the expectation that that country's law will be applied to their affairs”.322 Just as the
English treatise Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, provides “[a]n evasive choice of law
is unreal and unreasonable and therefore without effect”, 323 the preamble urges that third
country residents be denied treaty benefits in the face of evasive choices of tax and treaty law via
planning.
6.2.2

Preambles Showing “Legality” Requirement

The preambles impose, whether deliberately or not, the COL/col “legality” requirement. To be
legal, choices of law must not violate the law of the jurisdiction where the parties seek to enforce
their choice of law clause and have the entitlements flowing therefrom acknowledged. The
preambles make explicit that as treaty partners, the contracting states intend to extend their treaty
benefits to each other’s residents, and not to residents of third jurisdictions. This is not merely
the contracting states’ intention, but in some cases, all that countries’ domestic law allows them
to do. The Canadian context is illustrative. Canada’s Constitution provides that legislative
authority and competence is divided between the provincial and federal governments along
subject-matter lines.324 The federal or provincial government’s failure to observe the parameters
of their legislative authority is unconstitutional and legislation wherein this occurs is invalid. In
this, respect for the division of powers is thus imbued in all of Canada’s statutes. The legislature
must not, as a latent feature in all of Canada’s statutes, extend its law-making competence
beyond its scope of sovereign constitutional authority and competence. The Canadian ITA
reflects such considerations. Canada’s domestic income tax legislation provides that its income
tax laws are not to extend beyond those properly identified as residents325 or those with
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sufficiently close connections to Canada in a way that is fiscally significant to the tax authorities,
i.e., being employed in Canada, carrying on business in Canada, or disposing of taxable
Canadian property.326 Tax treaties and the benefits extended under tax treaties are a subset of
Canada’s tax laws.
Courts, one of the ultimate interpreters of tax treaties, must apply the express and implied
rules and terms of statutes and legislation, i.e., that Canadian laws are only to extend to those
whom Canada has legislated them to apply, that constrain the treaty’s application in any event of
the taxpayer’s choice of tax law and treaty law.327 Canada’s tax laws including tax treaties and
benefits as mandatory rules must not flow to those not properly subject to Canada’s laws.
Constitutionally, it is not legal for Canada’s tax laws, which include treaty laws, to extend to
those outside subjection to Canada’s laws.
In this, the preamble accords with Canada’s implicit domestic constitutional legal
requirements, and in this the “legality” requirement in the COL/col anti-abuse approach, because
it is Canadian law via the Constitution that Canada not allow its law, including tax law and
subset tax treaty law and related benefits, to extend the boundaries of its sovereign jurisdiction,
i.e., to extend legal obligations, or treaty benefits, to those to whom its law should have no
business applying, being residents of third jurisdictions who are not connected to the jurisdiction
but for planning designed to facilitate obtaining treaty benefits. To allow tax benefits to flow to
third-country residents is theoretically an overextension of Canada’s commitment to have its tax
laws and related benefits, including treaty benefits extend only to those properly within its tax
base as domestic statutes, whether the ITA or statutes enacting treaties, provide. To deny benefits
in these circumstances is to operate within the bounds of constitutional principles imbued in
statutes, as such demonstrating implicit compliance with the “legality” requirement in the
COL/col anti-abuse approach.
6.2.3

Preambles Showing “Public Policy” Requirement

The preambles further require that indirect choices of tax law not be contrary to public policy,
implicitly adopting the COL/col posture that otherwise-legal arrangements will be contrary to
public policy if they form part of a plan to break the laws of a country with which the
326
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arrangement has connections in fact. The preambles expressly acknowledge the treaty partners’
commitment to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for nil or insufficient
taxation, demonstrating their aliveness to the fact that efforts to reduce double taxation can
simultaneously create opportunities for nil or insufficient taxation. The methods identified as
“tax evasion or avoidance” imply that some otherwise applicable law is being evaded or avoided
when the taxpayer brings itself out of the tax net in which they would otherwise be caught by
avoiding the laws that would otherwise apply to them but for the specifically named “treaty
shopping arrangements”. As the court wrote in Snoxell, “[t]he parties cannot make a pretence of
contracting under one law in order to validate an agreement that clearly has its closest connection
with another law” .328 In Canada and elsewhere, it is a mandatory rule to submit to the tax laws of
one’s country. Bare compliance with the text of income tax provisions is not sufficient to relieve
a person of tax liability. 329 To attempt bare statutory compliance with an intention to evade
attracts penalties under the Canadian ITA.330 Under section 239 of the Canadian ITA for example,
it is an offence to have “wilfully, in any manner, evaded or attempted to evade compliance with
[the ITA] or payment of taxes imposed by [the ITA]”.331 Tax laws of a country include the
treaties to which its executive has agreed and that have been passed through its legislative
process. “Third country residents” accessing benefits that its law expressly does not provide, i.e.,
because the tax treaty was not negotiated to extend such benefits, is an implicit violation of what
the third country resident’s law does provide, because the third country resident is stepping
outside of what its law expressly provides to access something else beyond its bounds. Third
country residents’ intention to evade the law of the state whose laws would otherwise apply is an
implicit contravention of those laws.
According to the conflict of laws “public policy” requirement, arrangements which break
the express and implied mandatory rules of another state violate public policy. In this, “treaty
shopping arrangements” as an arrangement to contravene the tax and treaty laws of another state
violate public policy. The preambles are sensitive to this violation. Castel and Walker’s words
shine through the preambles. According to the preambles, legally-constituted resident
328
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companies, like “[a] contract that can be formed legally”, 332 but intending to avoid and therein
contravene the tax laws of a third jurisdiction, similar to “a plan to contravene the law of another
country,” 333 will have treaty entitlements declined, just as a foreign-law-breaking choice of law
clause and entitlements flowing therefrom “has been held to be unenforceable on the ground that
to enforce it would be against international comity and thus violate the public policy of the
forum”.334
The revised preamble, like COL/col anti-abuse approach, provides for the treaty’s
interpretation so that treaty benefits are withheld where the taxpayer’s choice of tax and treaty
law is not bona fide, not legal, and is contrary to public policy.
6.3

“Limitation on Benefits” to Address Treaty Shopping

The OECD 2015 Action 6 Report calls for treaty-based specific anti-avoidance rules, such as
LOBs, to address “treaty shopping situations that can be identified on the basis of criteria based
on the legal nature [of], ownership in, and the general activities of, certain entities”.335 In the
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty,336 the MLI and the Canada-USA Tax Treaty,337 the LOBs
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(collectively, “the LOBs”) operate as a set of rules describing the persons, income, and
circumstances for which treaty benefits will flow. LOBs are generally divided into recognizable
components.

6.3.1

Component 1: Prima Facie Nexus

The first component of the LOBs provide that tax treaty benefits only flow to a defined class of
“qualified persons”. In the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, the LOB extends treaty benefits only
to residents of contracting states who are qualified persons defined in Article 29(2).338 MLI
Articles 7(8) and 7(9) define a qualified person as an individual, a government agency of one of
the contracting jurisdictions, a publicly traded entity, a not-for-profit organization, a retirement
benefits organization, and an entity that invests funds for retirement benefits organizations if at
least 50% owned directly or indirectly by qualified persons. The Canada-USA Tax Treaty
provides that treaty benefits flow only to “qualified persons” per Article 29A(1)(a)339 as defined
via in Article 29A(2) to include resident natural persons,340 government bodies of contracting
states,341 and estates.342 The first component of the LOBs engage explicit “self-executing”343
notions of nexus, satisfaction of which treaty benefits will prima facie flow without more.
6.3.2

Component 2: Nexus In Fact

The second component of the LOBs provide additional rules to extend treaty benefits to resident
persons with sufficient connection to one of contracting states even though they are not qualified
persons.

(Washington: Department of the Treasury, 2007) [Technical Explanation] at 51. Article 25 of the Fifth Protocol
replaces Article 29A of the treaty providing an updated LOB provision: Technical Explanation at 51. On July 10,
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Tax Treaty. Canada's Department of Finance indicated in a press release it agreed with the content of the USA
Technical Explanation. The USA Technical Explanation thus amounts to a common technical explanation between
Canada and the USA.
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In the 2017 OECD Model Tax Treaty, un-qualified persons will be entitled to treaty
benefits if “engaged in the active conduct of a business in its state of residence and the income
emanates from, or is incidental to, that business,”344 a “headquarters company”,345 if more than a
certain portion agreed upon by the contracting states of that un-qualified person is owned by
persons entitled to treaty benefits;346 or where the contracting states otherwise agree to grant the
treaty benefits,347 or where the competent authority exercises discretion to extend treaty benefits
in any event.348
The MLI extends treaty benefits to un-qualified persons where “the resident is engaged in
the active conduct of business in the first mentioned contracting jurisdiction, and the income
derived from the other contracting jurisdiction emanates from, or is incidental to, that business”,
but does not include “operating as a holding company”, “providing overall supervision or
administration of a group of companies”, “providing group financing (including cash pooling)”,
and “making or managing investments, unless carried on by a bank, insurance company or
registered securities dealer in the ordinary course of its business as such”.349 Article 7(10)(b)
carries on this thread and provides that where a resident of one contracting jurisdiction derives
income themselves or through a connected person from business activity in the other contracting
jurisdiction, tax treaty benefits will flow only if “the business activity is carried on by the
resident in the first mentioned contracting jurisdiction to which the income is related is
substantial in relation to the same activity or a complimentary business activity carried on by the
resident or such connected person in the other contracting jurisdiction” as to be “determined
based on all the facts and circumstances”. Article 7(10)(c) goes on to provide “activities
conducted by connected persons with respect to a resident of a contracting jurisdiction to a
Covered Tax Agreement shall be deemed to be conducted by such resident”. Article 7(11)
provides that an un-qualified person is entitled to treaty benefits if for at least six months in a 12
month period, including the time when the benefit would have flowed, the “equivalent
344
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beneficiaries” of the un-qualified person “own, directly or indirectly, at least 75% of the
beneficial interest in the resident”.
In the Canada-USA Tax Treaty, corporate entities must also meet additional requirements
beyond mere residency before treaty benefits will flow. For publicly traded companies, the
“principal class of shares or units (and any disproportionate class of shares or units[350])” must be
“primarily and regularly traded” on one or more recognized stock exchanges.351 For subsidiaries
of publicly traded companies or trusts,352 the subsidiary must have five or fewer publicly traded
corporate qualifying persons owning directly or indirectly more than 50% of the aggregate vote
and value of the shares and more than 50% of the vote and value of each disproportionate class
of shares, excluding debt substitute shares353 in both cases. Similarly, not-for-profit organizations
where “more than half of the beneficiaries, members or participants of the organization are
qualifying persons” are entitled to treaty benefits.354 Benefit organizations are also deemed
qualified persons and receive treaty benefits355 if they are resident trusts, companies,
organizations or other exempt organizations described in Article 21(2) (exempt organizations)
who are generally exempt from income taxation in the tax year in the contracting state where
they are resident, operate exclusively to administer or provide pension, retirement or employee
benefits,356 and “established for the purpose of providing benefits primarily to individuals who
are qualifying persons, [or] persons who were qualifying persons within the five preceding
years”. Organizations that earn income for not-for-profit or benefits organizations357 are also
entitled to treaty benefits if their beneficiaries are qualified persons.
Like the MLI LOB, un-qualified persons may still be entitled to treaty benefits under the
Canada-USA Tax Treaty in respect of “those items of income that are connected with the active
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conduct of a trade or business”. 358 If resident un-qualifying persons or resident persons related359
to them are “engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business … other than the business of
making or managing investments, unless those activities are carried on with customers in the
ordinary course of business by a bank, an insurance company, a registered securities dealer or a
deposit-taking financial institution”, treaty benefits flow in respect of “income derived from the
other Contracting State in connection with or incidental to that trade or business (including any
such income derived directly or indirectly by that resident person through one or more other
persons that are residents of that state), but only if that trade or business is substantial in relation
to the activity carried on in that other state giving rise to the income in respect of which the
benefits provided under this Convention by that other state are claimed”.360 “[C]onnection”
means, e.g., the income is derived upstream, downstream, or parallel to the business activity in
the other contracting state.361 “[I]ncidental” refers to, e.g., income earned when a person in the
state of source issue securities using the working capital of the resident to yield short-term
investments.362 Income may be earned in connection with or incidental to an active trade or
business through a chain of ownership by wholly or partly owned resident subsidiaries as
anticipated through use of the terms “directly or indirectly”.363
6.3.3

Component 3: Denying Treaty Benefits if Causing Base Erosion

The third component of the LOBs add additional base erosion rules to address specific
circumstances.
In the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, Article 29(8) acknowledges “potential abuses may
result from the transfer of shares, debt claims, rights or property to permanent establishments set
up solely for [that] purpose in countries that do not tax, or offer preferential tax treatment to, the
income from such assets”.364 In light of this the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty denies treaty
benefits in circumstances where one contracting state considers income attributable to a
358
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permanent establishment located in a third country where the income is tax exempt, and provides
that the other contracting state need not grant treaty benefits with regard to the income the former
treaty country views as tax exempt.365
Article 29A(2)(e) of the Canada-US Tax Treaty investigates whether a company or trust
meets “ownership and base erosion tests”. The ownership prong of the test requires that 50% or
greater of the aggregate vote and value of the shares, and 50% or more of the vote and value of
each disproportionate class of shares, in both cases excluding debt substitute shares, not be
owned directly or indirectly by un-qualified persons.366 The ownership prong of the test looks
through the “chain of ownership”367 to determine if un-qualified persons own, directly or
indirectly 50% of the aggregate value of shares and shares that afford disproportionate rights.368
The base erosion prong of the test requires that “the amount of the expenses deductible from the
gross income (as determined in the state of residence of the company or trust) that are paid or
payable by the company or trust” directly or indirectly to un-qualifying persons must be less than
50% of the company's gross income for that period, being preceding fiscal period (or current
fiscal period if this is the first fiscal period).369
Under the “derivative benefits” test at Article 29A(4) of the Canada-USA Tax Treaty, a
company resident in one of the contracting states is entitled to benefits associated with
dividends,370 interest,371 and royalties372 even if not considered a qualifying person at 29A(1) and
(2) not satisfying the ownership and base erosion tests at 29A(3).373 “A derivative benefits test
entitles the resident of a Contracting State to treaty benefits if the owner of the resident would
have been entitled to the same benefit had the income in question been earned directly by that
owner”.374 In order to satisfy the ownership portion of the test, 90% of the aggregate vote and
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value of all of its shares, and at least 50% of the vote and value of any disproportionate shares, in
both cases excluding debt substitute shares, must be owned directly or indirectly by a qualifying
person or a person who has all of the following characteristics; 1) be a resident of a third country
with whom Canada or the USA has a comprehensive income tax convention under which the
third country resident is entitled to all the benefits provided under that third tax treaty, e.g.,
passing a LOB test if there is one; 2) would be a qualifying person as per Article 29A(2), or if
the un-qualifying person had been a resident of Canada or the USA and seeks benefits only in
respect of income connected to active trade or business, would have satisfied the “active trade or
business” test per Article 29A(3); and 3) and would be entitled under the third tax treaty to a rate
of tax on dividends, interest, and royalties that is “at least as low as the rate applicable under [the
Canada-USA Tax Treaty]”. The base erosion prong of the test is the same as the base erosion test
provided in Article 29A(2)(e), i.e., that “the amount of the expenses deductible from the gross
income (as determined in the state of residence of the company or trust) that are paid or payable
by the company or trust” directly or indirectly to un-qualifying persons must be less than 50% of
the company’s gross income for that period, being the preceding fiscal period (or current fiscal
period if this is the first fiscal period) to ensure that income receiving preferred tax treatment is
not indirectly transferred in great swaths to un-qualified persons not entitled to receive benefits
under the treaty.
In the LOBs, un-qualifying persons who do not satisfy any of the exceptions may seek
discretionary relief from the competent authorities. Under the MLI, competent authorities may
permit treaty benefits “taking into account the object and purpose of the Covered Tax
Agreement, but only if such resident demonstrates to the satisfaction of such Competent
Authority that neither its establishment, acquisition or maintenance, nor the conduct of its
operations, had as one of its principal purposes the obtaining of benefits under the Covered Tax
Agreement”.375 Under the Canada-US Tax Treaty, the competent authority determines the unqualified person’s entitlement to tax treaty benefits “on the basis of all factors including the
history, structure, ownership and operation of that person” and whether as per Article 29A(6)(a),
“its creation and existence did not have as a principal purpose the obtaining of benefits under
[the Canada-USA Tax Treaty] that would not otherwise be available” or as per Article
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29A(6)(b), “it would not be appropriate, having regard to the purpose of this article, to deny the
benefit of this Convention to that person”.
6.3.4

LOBs Reflecting “Choice of Law” Anti-Abuse Approach

6.3.4.1 LOBs Showing “Bona Fide” Requirement
Choices of law with no nexus to the chosen jurisdiction must not serve an evasive purpose. The
MLI, OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and Canada-USA Tax Treaty LOBs implicitly reflect this
requirement.376
First, The LOBs ascertain prima facie nexus and extend treaty benefits on that basis,
analogous to how the COL/col approach does not further interrogate choices of law if the
contract is connected to the chosen jurisdiction. The MLI’s LOB and the Canada-USA Tax
Treaty’s LOB both begin by providing that benefits should only flow to “qualified persons” and
enumerate prima facie instances of connection to one of the contracting states which are
“unlikely to be used, as the beneficial owner of income, to derive benefits under the Convention
on behalf of a third country person”,377 and so further testing is not generally required,378 e.g.,
natural persons, government entities, and estates.379 In these instances contracting states can
more readily assume connection to a contracting state and therefore the treaty on the basis of
residence and are unlikely to be used for treaty shopping purposes. Sufficient nexus may also be
established through earning the income in the “active conduct of a business”380 or via “derivative
benefits” through the chain of ownership as qualified person.381 “The active trade or business test
looks not solely at the characteristics of the person deriving the income, but also at the nature of
the person’s activity and the connection between the income and that activity” and imposes “the
substantiality requirement … intended to prevent treaty shopping” and avoid instances where a
third country investor could conduct a very small business in one contracting state, and seek to
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Canada-USA Tax Treaty, ibid, arts 29A(2)(a) (natural persons), 29A(2)(b) (contracting state government
entities), 29A(2)(f) (estates).
380
Canada-USA Tax Treaty, ibid, art 29A(3);
381
MLI, supra note 302, art 7(10)(b); Canada-USA Tax Treaty, ibid, art 29A(2)(4).

92

have the yields from a much larger business in the other contracting state pass through at a taxpreferred rate.382 The “active conduct of business test” and “derivative benefits test” imply that
only if un-qualifying persons bear sufficient connection to one of the contracting states will
treaty benefits be justified
Duff opines that the LOB in the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty is “designed to limit
treaty benefits to residents of contracting states with substantive economic connections to that
state and circumstances where entitlement to treaty benefits does not result from abusive tax
treaty shopping”.383 Similarly, the Canada-USA Tax Treaty LOB “addresses the problem of
“treaty shopping” by residents of third states by requiring, in most cases, that the person seeking
benefits not only be a US or Canadian resident but also satisfy other tests”,384 identifies “persons
whose residence in the other Contracting State is not considered to have been motivated by the
existence of the Convention”, and limits the flow of treaty benefits on that basis.385 This sounds
very much like the COL/col anti-abuse approach “bona fide” requirement that choices of law
bear connection to the chosen law, and if not, do not serve an evasive purpose.
Next, the LOBs ascertain evasive purpose and deny treaty benefits, analogous to rejecting
a choice of law in COL/col, if such is found. Where connection and unlikely use in treaty
shopping cannot be assumed prima facie, heightened criteria apply to justify extension of treaty
benefits, e.g., publicly traded companies and their subsidiaries,386 not-for-profit and benefit
organizations,387 and un-qualified persons whom qualified persons directly or indirectly own a
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Technical Explanation, supra note 337 at 58-59; see e.g. re television sets) While the small business may be
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companies or trusts (art 29A(2)(d)): E.g., Canada-USA Tax Treaty, supra note 62, art 29A(2)(c).
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Canada-USA Tax Treaty, ibid, art 29A(2)(g)-(i). Specifically, the criteria for not-for-profit organizations (art
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the beneficiaries, members or participants of the not-for-profit organization must be qualifying persons. The criteria
for tax-exempt organizations, such as a not-for-profit trust, company, or organization, also indicate Canada and the
USA’s sensitivity to nexus before extending treaty benefits as art 29A(2)(g)-(i) ensures the tax-exempt organizations
not providing services to resident individuals of either contracting state do not receive benefits under the treaty. Both
imply that treaty benefits should only flow where the tax-exempt entity maintains nexus to one of the contracting
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50% share in for six months out of the 12 month period. Article 29A(e) of the Canada-USA Tax
Treaty imposes the additional requirement of the ownership and base erosion test on some
corporate taxpayers. The Technical Explanation provides “[t]he ownership/base erosion test
recognizes that the benefits of the Convention can be [improperly] enjoyed indirectly not only by
equity holders of an entity, but also by that entities’ obligees, such as lenders, licensors, service
providers, insurers and reinsurers, and others”388 and that a Canadian or USA company could
conceivably have its taxable income reduced to near nothing due to deductible amounts paid to a
third country resident while enjoying tax exempt status by virtue of the convention in the other
contracting state,389 in effect, allowing income to float a third country residence at minimal tax
cost with no reciprocal benefit to the contracting state footing the bill.390 The ownership/base
erosion test “requires that both qualifying persons substantially owned the entity and that the
entity’s tax base is not substantially eroded by payments (directly or indirectly) to non-qualifying
persons”391 and employs “look through principles”392 in respect of fiscally transparent entities
deemed so under the laws of the residence state.393 The base erosion prong ensures that unqualified persons not entitled to receive benefits under the treaty, even if for example owning
Canadian companies through a 50% ownership in a USA company where ownership is
ultimately traced to a resident of a third state, do not receive benefits of the treaty indirectly by
transfers. Article 7(12) of the MLI and Article 29A(6) of the Canada-USA Tax Treaty acts as a
catch-all, allowing competent authorities to extend treaty benefits but only where both are
satisfied that the arrangement does not serve a treaty shopping purpose.
The designs of the MLI, Canada-USA Tax Treaty and OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty
employ an approach of ascending interrogation: the less connection an entity has to the
contracting states, the more likely and therefore more intense the inquiry into the entity’s
possible treaty shopping purpose. Contracting states deny choice of tax law and resultant flow of
treaty benefits where the chosen law is unconnected to the arrangement and selected to facilitate

states. Wherever art 29(2) renders a one a qualified person and allows treaty benefits to flow, there must be certain
connection between the taxpayer, whether or not they are a “qualified person”, and a contracting state extending the
treaty benefits.
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Technical Explanation, ibid at 56.
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Technical Explanation, ibid at 56, introduced by the Protocol (e.g., new paragraph 6 of art 4.
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Besides entities that are resident in the source state; See example 56 of Technical Explanation, supra note 337.
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an evasive or contravening purpose. In this, the LOBs implicitly echo COL/col anti-abuse
approach’s requirement that choices of law, whether directly through clauses or indirectly
through tax planning, be bona fide.
6.3.4.2 LOBs Showing “Legality” Requirement
LOBs implicitly incorporate the COL/col legality requirement which provides that parties’
choice of law in a contract will not be valid if the choice of law violates the express and implied
rules and terms of statutes and legislation to which parties are subject in any event of the parties
choice of law, i.e., regardless of whether the parties have chosen a different governing law for
their bargain.394 LOBs not only acknowledge that domestic anti-abuse rules exist alongside tax
treaties, but suggest that domestic anti-abuse rules be employed to work in tandem with the
treaty LOBs to address situations that the treaty does not, together forming a comprehensive antitreaty abuse regime. Treaty benefits are denied if not legal according to domestic anti-abuse
rules.
The OECD 2015 Action 6 Report from which the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty and
MLI LOBs are inspired advised contracting states enact supplementary mechanisms to address
conduit arrangements not covered by tax treaties, including “domestic anti-abuse rules or judicial
doctrines that would achieve a similar result”.395 Pre-dating the OECD 2015 Action 6 Report, the
Technical Explanation on Article 29A(7) of the Canada-USA Tax Treaty emphasizes this role
for domestic anti-abuse rules. Article 29A(7) “permits a Contracting State to rely on general antiavoidance rules to counter arrangements involving treaty shopping through the other Contracting
State”, for example, in treaty shopping circumstances.396 For instance, the USA may apply
“substance-over-form and anti-conduit rules” for suspected treaty shopping involving Canadian
entities. The Technical Explanation’s acknowledgement that domestic anti-abuse rules support
the operation of an LOB is not unique to the Canada-USA Tax Treaty. The Technical
Explanation states that the principle of contracting states being able to employ domestic antiabuse law to target treaty shopping is “inherent in this Convention”, is “inherent in other tax
conventions concluded by the USA or Canada,” and similarly endorsed by the OECD.397 In the
394
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USA, for example, domestic anti-abuse rules serve to “compliment the explicit anti treaty
shopping rules of Article [29A]”.398 Canada and the USA expressly acknowledge that “antitreaty shopping rules determine whether a person has a sufficient nexus to Canada to be entitled
to benefits under the Convention” and that “anti-abuse provisions under USA domestic law
determine whether a particular transaction should be recast in accordance with the substance of
the transaction” implicitly suggesting that interrogation into “substance” will expose the nexus of
the entity or income to the USA.399 The domestic anti-abuse rules surrounding the LOBs make it
so that an entity resident in one of the contracting states that would be prima facie entitled to the
benefits afforded by the convention still must satisfy the demands of domestic anti-abuse rules,
e.g., business purpose, substance over form, step transaction or conduit principles or other antiavoidance rules, providing an additional stop-gap.400 Engaging domestic anti-avoidance rules to
support the efforts of the LOBs make compliance with the former part of a comprehensive
regime on which the LOBs rely.
Acknowledging the LOBs in context as operating alongside and in tandem with domestic
anti-avoidance rules to form a comprehensive regime, LOBs are illuminated not just as the
provisions in a treaty, but part of a greater legal web that relies on domestic legal rules to deliver
its purpose. In this greater legal web comprised of both domestic and treaty law, choices of tax
and treaty law via planning must be permissible under both the LOB and domestic anti-abuse
rules. The requirement that choice of law be valid under domestic law of the country asked to
validate the choice of law clause cuts to core of the legality requirement found in the COL/col
anti-abuse approach.
6.3.4.3 LOBs Showing “Public Policy” Requirement
In conflict of laws, choices of law which violate the laws of the state to which the contract has
connections will fail “public policy” requirement. The court in Snoxell held “[t]he parties cannot
make a pretence of contracting under one law in order to validate an agreement that clearly has
its closest connection with another law”.401 Taxpayers engage in treaty shopping arrangements
under a similar “pretense”: choosing a tax and tax treaty law other than the tax and tax treaty law
398
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which bears the closest connections to their arrangement in order to avoid the less favourable tax
and therefore tax treaty outcomes flowing from submission to the tax and tax treaty law bearing
the closest connections to their arrangement. Attempts to circumvent tax laws, even with strict
compliance to statutory demands, inadvertently violates the tax laws of the country whose laws
are being circumvented by the treaty shopping arrangement.402
Consider the example of Article 29A(d) of the Canada-USA Tax Treaty in the context of
a Canadian or USA subsidiary of a publicly traded company whose publicly traded parent
company or intermediate owners in the chain of ownership are residents of a third state and not
residents of Canada or the USA.403 Treaty benefits would not flow to the USA or Canadian
resident subsidiary to the extent of its fiscal transparency because its immediate or intermediate
owners are not qualifying persons.404 The Technical Explanation is explicit that “by applying the
principles introduced by the Protocol (e.g., paragraph 6 of Article [4]) in the context of this rule,
one “looks through” entities in the chain of ownership that are viewed as fiscally transparent
under the domestic law of the state of residence (other than entities that are resident in the state
of source)”.405 Requiring that “each company or trust in the chain of ownership is a qualifying
person”406 guards against corporate subsidiaries who are not owned by qualifying persons
accessing treaty benefits. The look-through operates with the implicit effect of ascertaining if
third-country residents are trying to contravene the tax laws of their own countries by subjecting
income to another tax regime that principles of eliminating double taxation would render the
only regime to apply.
In this, treaty shopping much resembles COL/col cases where parties make a choice of
law which acts as an intermediary regime through which to access benefits not afforded under
the law that would otherwise apply and fail on public policy grounds. In Regazzoni,407 the parties
inserted unrelated English law to govern the sale of Indian goods to be exported to South Africa
because Indian law prohibited export of goods to South Africa. The parties sought to use the
English law to achieve what Indian law did not permit, and in effect, circumvent Indian law’s
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export prohibition. The parties’ choices of an unrelated intermediary jurisdiction’s law were held
invalid by the English Court. These conflict of laws cases illustrate judicial treatment when the
jurisdiction’s own law is interposed as an unrelated intermediary in an arrangement to violate the
law of the country with the closest connection similar to the parties’ posture in the LOBs. Similar
to the COL/col case holdings, contracting states will not tolerate the imposition of their tax and
treaty law for the purpose of circumventing the laws of the country most connected to the dispute
and which would otherwise apply, deny treaty benefits, and find the choice of tax and treaty law
invalid, in an implicit mobilization of the COL/col anti-abuse approach “public policy”
requirement.
6.4

“Principal Purpose Test” to Address Treaty Shopping

In addition to specific anti-avoidance rules like the LOB, the OECD 2015 Action 6 Report also
advocated the next update of the OECD model tax treaty include “a more general anti-abuse rule
based on the principal purpose of transactions or arrangements”.408 The OECD 2015 Action 6
Report acknowledged that while the enumerated LOB rules contain “objective criteria” and
therefore provide “more certainty” they cannot capture “other forms of treaty abuses”.409 An
example is transactions involving conduits where “a resident of a Contracting State that would
otherwise qualify for treaty benefits is used as an intermediary by persons who are not entitled to
these benefits”.410 To buttress the specificity of the LOB, the OECD 2015 Action 6 Report
proposed the general anti-abuse rule, or “principal purpose test” which “incorporates the
principles” that:
[T]he benefits of a tax treaty should not be available where one of the principal purposes of arrangements
or transactions is to secure a benefit under a tax treaty and obtaining that benefit in these circumstances
would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the tax treaty.411

In the 2017 OECD Model Tax Treaty, the PPT appears at Article 29(9):
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a benefit under this Convention shall not be
granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all
relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any
arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that
408
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granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions of this Convention.

The PPT appears in Articles 7(1)-(5) of the MLI. Article 7(1) is substantially similar to its
equivalent in the OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty:
Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement
shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard
to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any
arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that
granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.

Duff describes the basic structure of the PPTs as containing three distinct tests: the “results test”,
the “purpose test”, and the “object and purpose test”.412 The “results test” provides that in order
for the tax treaty benefit to be denied, the arrangement or transaction must have “resulted directly
or indirectly in [the] benefit”.413 The “purpose test” requires that the tax treaty benefit be denied
if it is “reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that
obtaining the benefit was one of the principal purposes” of the arrangement or transaction that
resulted in the benefit.414 The “object and purpose test” renders the PPT to not apply where “it is
established that granting the benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the
object in purpose of the relevant [treaty] provisions”.415
6.4.1

PPTs Reflecting “Choice of law” Anti-Abuse Approach

6.4.1.1 PPTs Showing “Bona Fide” Requirement
In the COL/col anti-abuse approach, choices of law made for the purpose of evading mandatory
rules are not bona fide and therefore not valid. The PPT implicitly adopts a similar posture by
foreclosing the application of treaty provisions, amounting to mandatory rules, where taxpayers
seek to leverage them outside of their object and purpose.
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Under the PPT, taxpayers cannot choose a law for the purposes of evading the tax and
treaty rules of the law that is most connected to their arrangement and which would otherwise
apply but for their planning. In Canadian COL/col, “mandatory rules” are “any statutory rules
that, according to express or implied terms of the legislation, bind the parties notwithstanding
that their contract is otherwise governed by the law of a foreign”,416 i.e., “rules the parties cannot
contract out of.”417 Tax laws, including the statutes that inevitably bring treaties into force, may
be considered mandatory rules.418
The PPT requires that taxpayers establish that the benefit under the convention (enabled
by an implicit selection of tax and treaty law) accrued “in accordance with the object and
purpose of the relevant provisions” of the covered tax agreement, being mandatory rules. This
involves identifying the relevant treaty provisions,419 determining the object and purpose of the
treaty provisions,420 and assessing the facts. Ascertaining the object and purpose of a treaty
provision involves “consider[ing] the text of the provision, construing its rationale or policy in
the context of other treaty provisions, including the preamble, as well as extrinsic materials such
as explanatory memorandums and commentaries (provided that the commentaries are not subject
to any relevant reservations)”.421 The facts and circumstances of the arrangements giving rise to
the benefit tell the story of if the benefit accords with the object and purpose its extension was
intended to create. If the benefit is not flowing “in accordance with the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions” the arrangement is implicitly contravening a mandatory rule, i.e., the treaty
provision which is to apply according to its object and purpose.
In COL/col, “parties cannot choose a law for the purpose of evading a mandatory rule of
the law that objectively is most closely connected to their contract.”422 This implies that but for
416
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the choice of law clause, the “law that objectively is most closely connected to [the] contract”
would apply. “Evading a mandatory rule” imposed by the law that would otherwise apply is
analogous to obtaining a benefit not available under the law that would otherwise apply through
subversive means or arrangements. Both the COL/col bona fide requirement and the PPT
determine the benchmark for applicable law on a sort of “but for” basis. But for the choice of law
via tax planning (in the PPT context) or express terms in a contract (in the conflict of laws
context), what obligations would the taxpayer or party be subject to? The PPT queries, e.g., ‘but
for the arrangement, what would the tax consequence be to the party?’. COL/col similarly
queries ‘but for the choice of law, what would the legal obligations imposed upon the party be?’.
In both cases, the analysis asks if the tax consequences or obligations have been evaded.
According to the OECD commentary, the purpose of the PPT is “to provide benefits in
respect of bona fide exchanges of goods and services, and movements of capital and persons as
opposed to arrangements whose principal objective is to secure a more favourable tax
treatment”.423 In this, the PPT acts as a stop gap for other treaty articles, taking the approach that
strict compliance with a treaty provision to access its benefits in a way not aligned with its object
and purpose is the same as trying to evade the limits imposed by the treaty provision.
The PPT does not permit choices of tax and treaty law which evade mandatory rules, i.e.,
tax treaty provisions as inextricable from their imbued purpose, implicitly acknowledging the
COL/col approach that choices of law must be bona fide, i.e., not evasive.
6.4.1.2 PPTs Showing “Legality” Requirement
For certain countries, the COL/col legality requirement is latent in the PPT because the PPT
imposes the same approach and standard as those domestic anti-avoidance rules, such that
arrangements foreclosed by the PPT will also be foreclosed by some domestic anti-avoidance
rules.424 Many jurisdictions employ general anti-avoidance rules bearing substantial similarities
to the PPT with the intention of preventing base erosion.425 Acknowledging those statutes, the
supra note 236 at para 11; Vasquez, supra note 241 at para 40; and Seaways Corp, supra note 241 at para 27, each
citing the “evasion” interpretation of mala fide choice of law but holding it inapplicable on the facts.
423
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OECD commentary to the PPT provides its intent is inter alia to “confirm” the role of a general
anti-abuse principles “for States whose domestic law already allows them to address such
cases”.426
Similar to the requirements of the PPT, the Canadian GAAR, for example, requires the
existence of a tax benefit427, a “purpose test” to target only a transaction or series reasonably
considered to be undertaken for mala fide purposes,428 and an “misuse or abuse test” limiting the
application of the GAAR to where it can be reasonably considered that the transaction or series
directly or indirectly results in misuse or abuse of the ITA or other statutes read as a whole.429
The purpose test and the abuse and misuse test appear in most modern GAAR rules.430 The UK’s
general anti-abuse rule431 queries purpose by defining targeted “tax arrangements” as
arrangements that circumstances reasonably disclose to be the or a main purpose of obtaining a
tax advantage, and queries abuse and misuse by engaging GAAR where the tax arrangement
cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action in light of the relevant tax
provision including the extent that the results of the arrangement correspond with the provision’s
principles, whether steps in the arrangement are “contrived or abnormal”, and “whether the
arrangements are intended to exploit any shortcomings in those provisions”.432 In another
example, the European Court of Justice’s anti-abuse principle, codified in EU Council Directive,
Laying Down Rules Against Tax Avoidance Practices That Directly Affect the Functioning of the
Internal Market requires member states “ignore [for the purposes of computing tax liability] an
arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose
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not the case, noting the EU’s similar approach as the PPT: see David Duff, “Reflections on Tim Edgar’s “Building a
Better GAAR” (2020) 68:2 Can Tax J 579 [Duff, “Tim Edgar’s GAAR”] at 582.
426
OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, supra note 23 at para 169.
427
ITA, supra note 125, s 245 (1) for the definition of tax benefit.
428
ITA, ibid, s 245(3).
429
ITA, ibid, s 245(3);
430
Duff, “Tim Edgar’s GAAR”, supra note 425 at 581, and fns 4-5 regarding exceptions to general inclusion of
“purpose” and “abuse or misuse” elements in New Zealand and Australia’s GAARs; A recent survey of GAAR rules
is found in Michael Lang et al, eds., GAARs—A Key Element of Tax Systems in the Post-BEPS World (Amsterdam:
IBFD, 2016).
431
Finance Act 2013 (UK), 2003, c 29, s 206-215.
432
See Judith Freedman, “Designing a General Anti-Abuse Rule: Striking a Balance” (2014) 20:3 Asia-Pacific Tax
Bulletin 167 at 170.

102

or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the
applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances”.433
The PPT imposes a substantially similar bar to the domestic Canadian GAAR and
GAARs similar to it. Brown and Bogle reviewed cases decided by the operation of GAAR,
hypothesized the outcomes had the cases been decided by the operation of the PPT, and
compared outcomes to see if the PPT imposed a higher or lower standard than the Canadian
GAAR.434 They concluded a “limited change from the status quo” in that the PPT as a
“minimum standard introduced by the MLI is unlikely to change the analytic approach to tax
treaty transactions in Canada from the previous GAAR approach”.435 They write that “[i]f the
transaction or arrangement satisfies the GAAR’s object, spirit, and purpose test then in most
cases the PPT will be satisfied as well”. 436 Even with differences between them, “it is likely [the
courts] will come to the same conclusion [using the PPT as] they would under GAAR”. 437 “If
the GAAR does not operate to deny a benefit because the benefit is in line with the object, spirit,
and purpose of the provision then the same result is likely under the PPT”.438 Common standards
between the EU’s ATAD II, GAAR and the PPT are such that “should one be satisfied the other
surely is as well”. 439
Given that the PPT operates and makes similar demands to some domestic GAARs, such
that contravention of the PPT implies contravention of those domestic GAARs, choice of tax law
and treaty law must necessarily comply with domestic anti-avoidance rules to comply with the
PPT in certain legal contexts. Indirect choices of tax law, treaty law, and tax treaty benefits must
comply with domestic anti-abuse rules, just as direct choice of law clauses in contracts must
comply with the express and implied laws of the forum to meet the COL/col anti-abuse
requirement of “legality”.
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6.4.1.3 PPTs Showing “Public Policy” Requirement
Choices of law that form part of an arrangement to break the laws of another country are
contrary to public policy and thus invalid.440 The PPT similarly forecloses choices of tax and
treaty law which contravene the tax and treaty framework that exist between nations and are in
force domestically, the reach of which is undermined through tax planning which seeks to access
treaty provisions to obtain benefits the otherwise-applicable domestic law, which includes tax
and treaty framework that exist between nations and are in force domestically, does not provide.
‘Laws of another country’ include the legal frameworks that exist between nations and are in
force domestically.
The PPTs in the MLI and OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty provide identically that “a
benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or
capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that
obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that
resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit”. Regarding characterizing a benefit in a covered tax
agreement, Duff writes:
[T]he characterization of a benefit in the context of a specific arrangement or transaction necessarily
depends on a standard or benchmark against which the existence of a “benefit” is measured. Since the PPT
refers to a benefit “under the Covered Tax Agreement,” an obvious interpretation of this benchmark would
be the tax consequences that would have resulted under the domestic law of a contracting jurisdiction
absent the CTA.441

Despite the potentially punitive consequences,442 from a textual perspective, Duff concludes “it
seems more reasonable to conclude that the existence of a benefit under a CTA should be
determined by reference to the tax consequences that would have resulted under the domestic
law of a contracting jurisdiction absent the CTA, not the tax consequences that would have
resulted from an alternative arrangement or transaction that would otherwise have been carried
out”.443 This interpretation drives to the tax and treaty framework that exists between nations and
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is in force domestically which would have applied but for the arrangement and access to the
covered tax agreement.
According to Duff, “the tax consequences that would have resulted under the domestic
law of a contracting jurisdiction absent the CTA” are informed by the law of contracting
jurisdiction and the law of the third jurisdiction whose resident seeks to use the contracting
jurisdiction as an intermediary. The domestic law that applies but for the treaty shopping is not
only the domestic law of the contracting state, but forms a part of the tax and treaty landscape
that otherwise binds the third-country entity and that they must themselves comply with. Absent
a valid choice of law, the third country resident is bound by the tax and treaty law of their
“proper law” jurisdiction, and that includes the tax relationship negotiated or otherwise with the
contracting state whose tax treaty the third country entity now seeks to take advantage of. By
setting ‘but for’ benchmarks, the PPT implicitly acknowledges the surrounding legal context that
one country’s tax law includes its arrangements with other states, and that attempts to go outside
the bounds of that is a breach of a foreign legal rule most closely connected to the arrangement.
Courts in COL/col anti-abuse cases consider the insertion of their law to avoid legal obligations
in another jurisdiction closely connected with the arrangement to be contrary to public policy.444
6.5

Concluding on Anti-Treaty Shopping Rules

While the OECD acknowledges contracting states may employ a “certain degree of flexibility”
in adopting the revised preamble, LOB provision, and PPT to account for local characteristics,
i.e., where contracting states already have domestic anti-abuse or anti-avoidance rules rendering
general anti-abuse provisions in the treaty redundant, or where contracting states have
administrative resource limitations rendering detailed LOB provisions too challenging to
enforce,445 states must nonetheless “effectively address... treaty abuses along the lines of [the
OECD 2015 Action 6] report.”446 The OECD’s concern about “treaty shopping” shows its
implicit appreciation of the significance of choice of law selection in the international tax and
BEPS environment.447 Underlying each of these three anti-treaty shopping features in the MLI,
444
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OECD 2017 Model Tax Treaty, and Canada-USA Tax Treaty (in the case of the LOB) are the
implicit notion that multinational corporations’ choice of private law, tax law, and therefore tax
treaties and benefits flowing therefrom, should be limited to choices of tax law that are bona fide,
legal, and compliant with public policy. Lord Wright’s affirmation in Vita Food that a choice of
law must be bona fide and legal, and not contrary to public policy cuts to the core of the BEPS
Action 6 pursuit against “treaty shopping” by ensuring that treaty benefits only flow in certain
circumstances, that taxpayers do not slip from the tax net of jurisdictions who wield a lawful
claim, and that countries are not compelled to extend hard-negotiated benefits to persons not
intended to benefit from them.

concerning transfer pricing, BEPS Action 5 regarding preferred tax regimes, BEPS Action 6 concerning treaty
abuse. All interrogate the significance of a third jurisdiction with no connections.
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7

Conflict of Laws “Choice of Law” to Find Governing Law

The question of ‘what is the nature of the transaction, person, income, etc.?’ sits at the heart of
international conflicts of tax law. The first essential step to answering it is determining the
governing law to be used as a keystone. Supranational approaches, such as the OECD’s
harmonization proposals, and bilateral approaches of reconciliation, such as COL/col principles
latent in tax treaties, alike each propose a way to ascertain the governing law through which to
answer the question. While both answer the question well, only the latter does so while also
supporting states’ sovereign power to enact and enforce tax laws that align most closely with its
domestic community.
The foregoing discussion simplifies and focuses the pursuit of ascertaining the governing
law in archetypal conflict of tax laws by showing how governing law is ascertained in tax treaties
through a latent COL/col approach that reconciles countries’ legitimate, concurrent, and
simultaneous tax claims while supporting state sovereignty. Not only do tax treaties’ implicit
COL/col approach already do what supranational harmonization proposals endeavour to do, but
do so in support of state sovereignty.
In tax treaties, governing law is ascertained by many of the same legal principles as in
COL/col. COL/col principles acknowledge the inevitable encounter of countries’ legal systems,
anticipate diverse legal regimes, and support countries’ law-making sovereignty by permitting
both legal systems to remain intact, unchanged, and unharmonized even though one of the
contending legal systems prevails over the other contenders and applies in the circumstances as
the governing law. Because COL/col does these things, tax treaties in which they are implicit can
and do so as well.
Schiff Berman writes that “[t]he rise of global legal pluralism has brought renewed focus
to the core principles of conflict of laws (sometimes called private international law):
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments. In a world of multiple legal and quasilegal pronouncements, these doctrines become a core way of navigating the interactions, using
principles that derive from both legal formalism and political practicality”.448 Such renewed
focus can be detected in the articles in tax treaties providing foreign tax recognition, distributive
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rules, meanings for undefined terms, and anti-treaty shopping rules tax treaties in which COL/col
principles are latent.
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